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Abstract
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act represents
a turning point in the regulation of the OTC derivatives markets. By subjecting OTC derivatives
and the global markets in which they are traded to a variety of new requirements, the Act repre-
sents the first major attempt to regulate one of the most important components of the international
financial system. The rules that regulatory agencies must implement in order to effectuate the
intent of the Act, however, will inevitably have consequences on the market's future development
and utility that reach far beyond the United States. This article considers how the implementation
ofjust one aspect of the Dodd-Frank Act, mandatory central clearing, may impact commercial end-
users who routinely manage risk in the OTC derivatives market. Ultimately, through an analysis
of OTC derivatives, risk management, and central clearing, this article warns that the potential
negative unintended consequences associated with mandatory central clearing are likely to outweigh
the possible benefits.
I. Introduction
The recent financial crisis, which culminated in the collapse of Lehman Brothers and
the government "bailout" of American International Group, propelled credit default
swaps (CDS) and other derivatives into the public spotlight. Unfortunately, much of the
information disseminated to the public regarding derivatives and their connection to fi-
nancial instability portrayed the transactions in an unreasonably negative light.' Journal-
* Paul McBride is an associate in the Finance and Power, Trading & Renewables groups of Bracewell &
Giuliani LLP. Mr. McBride would like to thank the Securities Law Section of the Dallas Bar Association and
Prof. Marc Steinberg of the SMU Dedman School of Law for their support during the development of this
Article. The views and interpretations expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and are not
necessarily shared or endorsed by Bracewell & Giuliani LLP or its partners.
1. See Boyd Erman, Secrecy's the Real Scoundrel, Not Credit Default Swaps, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Mar. 2,
2010, at B2 ("(Credit default swaps] also killed American International Group, if the headlines following its
$85-billion bailout by the U.S. government are to be believed. More realistically, AIG tried to kill itself in a
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ists even went so far as to describe derivatives as "instruments of mass destruction,"
"financial weapons of mass destruction," and "the most dangerous instrument yet."2 Typi-
cally, these articles mentioned the positive attributes of derivatives only briefly, if at all.3
For example, a February 2010 front-page article in the New York Times dedicated just a
single paragraph, introduced by the statement "[dierivatives do not have to be sinister," to
the potential advantages associated with CDS contracts.4
While there undoubtedly was a strong relationship between derivatives markets and the
financial crisis, the suggestion that derivatives themselves are per se "sinister" is incorrect.5
When used responsibly, derivatives serve vital liquidity and price discovery functions and
permit market participants to hedge against unwanted risk.6 Nevertheless, the asserted
connection between the financial crisis and derivatives spurred efforts to increase regula-
tory oversight over derivatives transactions, particularly those executed in the "over-the-
counter" (OTC) market.7 Some individuals even argued in favor of severely restricting
the market for OTC derivatives, championing proposals that would have forced all deriva-
tives onto exchanges8 and completely outlawed CDS contracts.9 Fortunately, these draco-
nian measures, which ignored the benefits provided by a robust market for OTC
derivatives, failed to gain significant support.'0
In general, the financial reform legislation actually enacted by Congress pursued a more
balanced approach to the regulation of the OTC derivatives market." In fact, the propos-
als that shaped the final bill shared many common provisions, including requirements for
central clearing of OTC derivatives contracts and post-trade reporting for non-centrally
spectacular act of self-immolation, owing to brutally bad management." Erman explains that "because we're
talking about derivatives ... it's easy to shift the blame from the real bad actors to the tools.").
2. Gretchen Morgenson, It's Time for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2010, at BUI
(quoting Martin Mayer, a Guest Scholar at The Brookings Institution, on credit derivatives); Paul Wiseman,
Gensler Helps Lead the Charge to Expose OTC Derivatives, Resistance Looms From Wall Street, USA TODAY, Nov.
23, 2009, at B2 (quoting Warren Buffet).
3. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 2; but see Erman, supra note 1.
4. Louise Story, Landon Thomas Jr. & Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall Street Helped to Mask Debt Fueling
Europe's Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2010, at Al. Consistent with the "sinister" theme, the same article
described derivatives in general as "financial wizardry." Id.
5. See Darrell Duffle, Ada Li & Theo Lubke, Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure,
(FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., Staff Report No. 424, 2010).
6. GARRY J. ScINASI, SAFEGUARDING FINANcIAL STABILrrY: THEORY AND PRAcTICE 181 (2006); see
Randall Dodd, Consequences of Liberalizing Derivatives Markets, in CAPrrAL MARKEr LIBERALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 288, 296-97 (os6 Antonio Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
7. See, e.g., Hearing on OTC derivatives Reform and Addressing Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 11Ith Cong. 1 (2009) (written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Trea-
sury Secretary of the United States).
8. Morgenson, supra note 2.
9. Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 3145, 111th Cong. (as introduced by Representa-
tive Maxine Waters, July 9, 2009); Press Release, Representative Maxine Waters, Congresswoman Waters
Introduces Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act (uly 10, 2009), httpI//waters.house.gov/News/Docunent
Single.aspx?DocumentlD=140685.
10. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 9 ("From a naive viewpoint, it would be possible to cure the risks
posed by simply mandating that all derivatives trading be conducted on organized exchanges ... The elimina-
tion of the OTC market, however, would cause more harm than good.").
11. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 701-74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-802 (2010); see also Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2009, H.R. 4173, 11Ith Cong. §§ 3001-3304 (as passed by H.R., Dec. 11, 2009).
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cleared contracts. 12 Where the various suggestions tended to diverge however, was in the
allocation of responsibility between the government and the private sector. While some
people argued that too much or the wrong type of government control would unreasona-
bly increase the cost of risk management by limiting the availability of OTC derivatives,
others were fearful that without a strong role for government regulators, legislated re-
forms would not reduce systemic risk or promote financial stability.' 3
The tension between the role of private sector and the government in the future devel-
opment of the OTC derivatives market was no more evident than in the debate regarding
mandatory central clearing requirements.' 4 Despite the fact that legislators generally be-
lieved that central clearing was fundamental to any financial reform legislation, the appro-
priate scope of the requirement was subject to significant disagreement.' 5 Unfortunately,
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act did not end this argument. Instead of establishing
clear guidelines, the Dodd-Frank Act gives the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the unenviable task of de-
fining the contours of mandatory central clearing.16 Furthermore, in their implementa-
tion of the Dodd-Frank Act's requirements, the CFTC and SEC must work to ensure that
any newly promulgated domestic regulations are compatible with the larger gradually
emerging international framework for derivatives regulation and financial reform.'1 By
leaving the details of central clearing under the Dodd-Frank Act to the discretion of ad-
12. See, e.g., H.R. 4173; Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 20.
13. Compare Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury Press Room, Written Testimony of Treasury Secre-
tary Timothy F. Geithner before the Sen. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Hearing on OTC
Derivatives Reform and Addressing Systemic Risk (Dec. 2, 2009), https://ustreas.gov/press/releases/
tg425.htm (supporting significant government intervention), with Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By
The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regulation Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before
the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 71-75 (2009) (statement and written testimony of Robert Pickel,
Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives Association) (opposing significant government
intervention).
14. Compare Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury Press Room, supra note 13 (arguing in favor of
mandatory clearing for OTC derivatives contracts accepted for clearing by a central counterparty and ap-
proved by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission), with
Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regulation Of
Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, supra note 13 (arguing against
mandatory central clearing), and Darrell Duffie, Policy Issues Facing the Market for Credit Derivatives, in THE
RoAD AHEAD FOR THE FED 107, 111-12 (John D. Ciorciari & John B. Taylor eds., 2009) (noting that central
clearing has the potential to reduce net counterparty exposure and would not have prevented the collapse of
AIG).
15. See 156 CONG. REc. H5245 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statements of Rep. Peterson and Rep. Lucas).
16. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2) (directing the CFTC to continu-
ously "review each swap, or any group, category, type, or class of swaps to make a determination as to
whether the swap or group, category, type, or class of swaps should be required to be cleared.").
17. See generally Anthony Belchambers, OTC Derivatives and EU Regulatory Reform, FuTUREs INDUSTRY,
Jan. 2011, at 19-21; Steven Lofchie et al., No Crisis Wasted: Proposed EU and U.S. Regulation of OTC Deriva-
tives (Part I), BLOOMBERG L. REP.: COMMODYTSES & DERIvATvIEs, Nov. 15, 2010, at I (identifying differ-
ences between the Dodd-Frank Act and proposed derivatives regulations published by the European
Commission).
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ministrative agencies, Congress has ensured that central clearing will remain a contentious
topic for the foreseeable future.' 8
This article evaluates the case for and against mandatory central clearing of OTC deriv-
atives in order to determine the appropriate degree of government intervention. Ulti-
mately, this article concludes that because of the importance and dynamic nature of the
OTC derivatives market, the Dodd-Frank Act's imposition of mandatory central clearing
requirements is inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, by requiring central clearing,
the government will force the creation of new systemically important institutions without
ensuring the financial stability of existing systemically important institutions or the finan-
cial markets generally. Second, the regulatory uncertainty associated with determining
which OTC derivatives will require central clearing and which counterparties will be sub-
ject to the Dodd-Frank Act clearing requirements will substantially increase the cost of
risk management for commercial end-users of OTC derivative products.
In order to understand the relationship between central clearing and the OTC deriva-
tives market, Part I of this article reviews the fundamentals of derivatives and illustrates
how end-users employ OTC derivatives in risk management programs. Part II then in-
troduces the concept of central clearing and discusses the theoretical advantages associated
with central clearing of OTC derivatives. Arguing against mandatory central clearing,
Part M identifies how central clearing can actually increase systemic risk at the expense of
risk management programs implemented by commercial end-users of derivatives. Finally,
Part IV provides a brief conclusion and suggests that greater cooperation between govern-
ment agencies and the private sector, rather than the heavy-handed government regula-
tion possible, and arguably probable, under the Dodd-Frank Act, would more effectively
advance the twin goals of reducing systemic risk and promoting effective risk management
practices.
II. An Introduction to Derivatives and Their Application in Risk
Management
A. WHAT IS A DERIVATIVE?
While widespread public awareness of the derivatives market is arguably a relatively
recent phenomenon, derivatives are nearly as old as recorded history itself. As early as
1700 B.C., merchants and traders employed futures and options contracts in order to
mitigate or capitalize on the uncertainty associated with the future.' 9 Given the historical
underpinning of derivatives, the sudden urge to impose dramatic regulatory reform begs
the question: Why now? One probable answer is that because derivatives "sound arcane
and evil" and "are supposedly complicated. . ., it's easy to shift the blame from the real bad
18. See Michael M. Phillips, Finance Overhaul Casts Long Sbadow on the Plains, WAuL ST. J., July 13, 2010,
htEp-//online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748 7 0 42 58604575361182317501188.html# (noting the uncer-
tainty associated with the central clearing rule making process).
19. JoHN PETER CASTAGNINo, DERIVATIVES: THE KEY PRINCIPLEs 6 (3d ed. 2009); Dodd, supra note 6,
at 288. George Crawford and Bidyut Sen identify a 2,400-year-old work of Aristotle as the earliest reference
to derivatives. Aristotle's work told the story of the philosopher Thales who, in anticipation of a bumper
olive crop, purchased options to buy the rights to local olive presses during the harvest. When the philoso-
pher's prediction proved correct, he exercised the options and then leased the rights to the presses at a
significant profit. GEORGE CRAWFORD & BIDYLTr SEN, DERIVATIVES FOR DECISION MxAKERs 7-8 (1996).
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actors to the tools." 20 As terms like "derivatives" and "CDS" became synonymous with
perceptions of Wall Street excess, the public pressure on legislators to implement sweep-
ing reforms to "fix" the problem increased. 21 Therefore, in order to understand whether
specific regulatory changes are appropriate, it is first necessary to demystify what are, in
many cases, relatively straightforward financial transactions.
Essentially, a derivative is an agreement between counterparties that creates rights and
obligations relative to some underlying asset (the "underlying").22 The agreement conse-
quently derives its value from the value of the underlying.23 When parties originate an
OTC derivative contract, they effectively establish the value of the underlying, or the
likelihood that an event related to the underlying will (or will not) occur, at some point in
the future.24 As the market subsequently reassesses the value or probability associated
with the underlying, the value of the related derivative contract fluctuates. 25 The process
of continual reassessment results in a projected balance of payments between the
counterparties, along with the possibility that the balance will change over time.26 Inter-
estingly, the underlying can be nearly anything that the parties agree to use, including
"hard" commodities such as gold, "soft" commodities such as orange juice or pork bellies,
equity or debt securities, interest rates, currencies, indices, energy commodities, emission
credits, and even the weather. 27
Taxonomically, derivatives fit within one of four fundamental types based on the struc-
ture of the transaction and the rights and obligations created. These four types are (1)
forwards, (2) futures, (3) swaps, and (4) options.28 In the parlance of the industry, the term
used to describe the most basic derivative structures is "vanilla." 29 Because of the relative
simplicity of vanilla derivatives, they tend to be the most commonly traded varieties in the
derivatives markets. 30 As the rights and obligations created by the parties become more
complex, the resulting derivatives assume the moniker "exotics." Fundamentally, how-
ever, a derivative characterized as exotic is simply just a variation on the four basic deriva-
tive categories.31 For example, a "swaption" is nothing more than an option on a swap
contract.
3 2
20. Erman, supra note 1.
21. Cf Morgenson, supra note 2.
22. CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 1-2.
23. 1 ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, DOCUMENTATION FOR DEivATivEs 2 (4th ed. 2002).
24. CASTAGNINo, supra note 19, at 2.
25. See 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23.
26. See CASTAGNINo, supra note 19, at 2; 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23.
27. CASTAGNINo, supra note 19, at 1-2. A party's payments under a weather derivative are related to the
occurrence of weather events "such as temperature or precipitation levels, storms, and even wind speed and
sea wave size." 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 756-60. For example, electric utilities frequently hedge
business risks associated with the amount of energy used for heating and cooling by entering into weather
derivatives based on the difference between the average temperature for the day and a reference temperature
of 65"F. Id. at 758-60.
28. MICHAEL DuRBIN, ALL ABoTrr DERIVATivEs 2 (4th ed. 2006).
29. Id.
30. DCG Glossary, INT'L SwAPs AND DERIVATIvEs Ass'N, http://www.isda.org/cand_a/oper-commit-
dcg-glossary.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) (defining "vanilla" as "[a] derivative transaction which has a very
basic structure, likely to be most commonly traded in the relevant market.").
31. DuRsIN, supra note 28.
32. CASTAGNINo, supra 19, at 269 (in a swaption, the swap contract is the underlying).
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The first two categories, forwards and futures, are closely related forms of derivatives.
In a typical forward contract, one party agrees to purchase and another party agrees to sell
a quantity of the underlying at a future date.33 At the origination of the transaction, both
parties commit to a forward price, quantity, and delivery date for the underlying.34 As a
result, the forward contract insulates the counterparties from fluctuations in the underly-
ing's spot price that are harmful to their ultimate economic objective, while at the same
time denying the counterparties the opportunity to benefit from upside risk. 35 The result
is a "zero-sum game"- if the spot price of the commodity on the delivery date is above the
forward price, the seller's inability to take advantage of the higher spot price is offset by
the buyer's ability to purchase at the lower forward price. 36
A futures contract is functionally the equivalent of a forward contract with one signifi-
cant difference: regulatory treatment.37 Forward contracts are generally unregulated,
while futures contracts are subject to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).38 Specifically,
unless subject to an exemption granted by statute or the CFTC, it is unlawful to partici-
pate in "a contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery" except
through a designated contract market.39 This difference in regulatory treatment is largely
a product of the difference between how forward and futures contracts are ultimately set-
tied. In a forward contract the counterparties generally contemplate settling through the
future physical delivery of the underlying, whereas futures contracts are typically settled
financially without ever taking delivery of the underlying.40 As a practical matter, because
many futures trade on organized exchanges like the Chicago Board of Trade, the contracts
33. Id. at 33.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 33-34.
36. Id. at 34-35. The same result occurs in the opposite situation where the spot price on the day of
delivery is below the forward price: the buyer's loss is equal to the seller's gain.
37. See 1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVEs REGULATION § 1.02[31
(2004); see, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, 680 F.2d 573, 579-80 (9th
Cir. 1982).
38. 1 JOHNSON & HAzEN, supra note 37.
39. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2006). To determine if a contract is a futures contract, courts will typically evaluate the
structure of the transaction. Characteristics such as standardized terms, customers without a business use for
the commodity, and an expectation that the customer will not take delivery, suggest the existence of a futures
contract. I JOHNSON & HAzEN, supra note 37, § 1.02[5]. In addition to specifically enumerated items, the
definition of "commodity" for purposes of the CEA includes "all other goods and articles ... and all services,
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." 7 U.S.C.
§ la(4). As Johnson and Hazen explain, the definition "illustrates an important principle of commodities
regulation: its interest is in a form of economic activity, rather than in the attributes or character of the
underlying subject." 1 JOHNSON & HAzEN, supra note 37, § 1.02[l}.
40. See 7 U.S.C. § la(19) (2006). The CEA provides that "future delivery"-a necessary condition for
regulation as a futures contract under the CEA-"does not include any sale of any cash commodity for
deferred shipment or delivery." 7 U.S.C. § la(19). This definitional nuance, the "Forward Contract Exclu-
sion," exempts forward contracts from regulatory oversight by the CFTC. I GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note
23, at 76. See generally, Co Petro Mktg. Grsup, 680 F.2d at 576-80 (discussing the purpose of the Forward
Contract Exclusion and its development prior to 1982). Through a provision in the definition of "swap," the
Dodd-Frank Act preserves the Forward Contract Exclusion; however, by adding a new element of intent to
the exclusion, the Dodd-Frank Act arguably changes how the exclusion will apply. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. 1376, 1667 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § la(47)); 156 CONG. REc.
H5246-47 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (colloquy between Rep. Boswell and Rep. Peterson).
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typically include standard terms with only the contract price subject to negotiation.4 1 Ad-
ditionally, the marketability and liquidity afforded by exchange trading permits parties to
cancel their positions at any time by entering into offsetting transactions.42 With the
ability to offset, parties can effectively avoid any obligations associated with taking physi-
cal delivery of the underlying commodity.43
In a swap transaction, the parties to the contract agree to exchange, or "swap," future
cash flows determined by reference to a notional amount of an underlying. 4 Interest rate
swaps, which represent over fifty-six percent of all OTC derivatives contracts by notional
amount outstanding, are the simplest way to illustrate how swaps work.45 In an interest
rate swap, counterparties commit to exchange payments equal to the interest accrued on a
notional principle amount of an underlying currency at their respective agreed rates.46
For example, Figure 1 depicts an interest rate swap in which Party A commits to pay a
fixed rate of five percent while Party B commits to pay one of the floating London Inter-
Bank Offered Rates (LIBOR) on a notional amount equal to $10 million.47 During the
duration of the swap agreement, the payments between the parties will reflect the differ-
ence in the two rates applied to the notional amount, but the notional amount will never
change hands.48 For example, if the relevant LIBOR equals seven percent when a swap
payment is due, Party B will make a net "interest" payment of two percent to Party A.
Likewise, if LIBOR decreases to four percent for a subsequent settlement period, Party A
will make a net "interest" payment of one percent to Party B.49
41. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 37. For example, the contract size for live cattle futures traded on
the Chicago Board of Trade is 40,000 pounds and the minimum fluctuation, or "tick size" is $.00025 per
pound (ten dollars per contract). Live Cattle Futures, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/com-
modities/livestock/live-cattle contract specifications.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2011). Curiously, onions are
the only commodity for which futures trading is completely prohibited. 7 U.S.C. § 13-1 (2006).
42. 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 3; R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION To DERIVATIVES
324 (2009) ("Most futures contracts are closed prior to expiration. As a result, there are only a small number
of contracts that are entered into that lead to actual delivery.").
43. 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 3; JOHNSON, supra note 42.
44. JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 537.
45. CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 45. According to the Bank for International Settlements, of the nearly
$605 trillion of OTC derivatives in notional amounts outstanding, $437 trillion are based on interest rates
(72.3%), $342 trillion of which are interest rate swaps (56.5%). Statistical Annex, BIS Q. REv. Mar. 2010, at
A121, tbl.19, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r-qal003.pdf. The significance of the notional
amount outstanding is discussed infra at notes 137 through 142 and accompanying text.
46. 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 421. Plain vanilla swaps typically provide for semiannual pay-
ments and have maturities between three and ten years. JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 537.
47. See 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 421.
48. On swap payment dates, the obligations of the parties are cancelled and replaced by an obligation of the
party that owed the larger amount to pay the difference to the party that owed the smaller amount. In other
words, the payments between Party A and Party B are "netted" when they come due. CASTAGNINO, supra
note 19, at 58.
49. See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVEs Ass'N, 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (MUICURRENCY-
CROSS BORDER) § 2(c) (1992); CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 56-57. Through the process of "netting," the
obligations of the parties arising under the same transaction and in the same currency are, on the settlement
date, "automatically satisfied and discharged and . . . replaced by an obligation upon the party by whom the
larger aggregate amount would have been payable to pay to the other party the excess of the larger aggregate
amount over the smaller aggregate amount." INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVEs Ass'N, supra.
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Figure 1. Interest Rate Swap
Fixed (5%)o$1miln
r P a r t y A L) o $ 1 m i l n P a r t y B
Floating (LIBOR) on $10 million
An option contract, unlike a forward, future, or swap, imposes an obligation on only
one of the contracting parties-the writer of the option.50 The party holding the option
has the right, but not an obligation, to exercise the option at the agreed "strike price."5 If
the holder elects to exercise the option, then both parties become committed to perform
under the contract. 52 Two common forms of options are "call" and "put" options. A call
option gives the option holder the right to purchase from the option writer a specified
amount of the underlying at the strike price. Conversely, a put option gives the option
holder the right to sell a specified quantity of the underlying to the option writer at the
strike price.53 By purchasing an option, the holder minimizes the risk associated with any
possible adverse change in the price of the underlying without eliminating the opportunity
to benefit from favorable price movements.54 In other words, the holder will exercise the
option only when it is profitable to do so.ss
By understanding the structure of the four basic derivative contracts, the transactions
themselves no longer seem per se sinister. Furthermore, by knowing how derivative con-
tracts work, it becomes possible to appreciate how commercial end-users can creatively
employ derivatives strategies as part of an effective risk management program. In order to
maximize the advantages of derivatives as a risk management tool however, end-users
must have the flexibility to tailor the contracts to suit their specific business needs.56
While existing exchange-traded derivatives provide some opportunities for mitigating ge-
neric risks, without the ability to achieve customization through private bilateral negotia-
tions, end-users would be unable to protect themselves against risks particular to their
business.57 It is in response to this demand for custom derivative instruments that the
OTC derivatives market emerged.5
50. See 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 524.
5 1. Id.
52. CASTAGNINo, supra note 19, at 40-41.
53. Id.
54. See 1 GooCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 524.
55. CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 45.
56. See Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 9.
57. Id.
58. Hearing To Review Proposed Legilation By The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regulation
Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 74 (2009) (state-
ment and written testimony of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives
Association) ("Customized products exist only because end-users find them useful, and indeed necessary, in
their day-to-day operations. In fact, the privately negotiated derivatives business has grown because standard-
ized contracts are only of limited use in hedging.").
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B. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE OTC AND EXCHANGE-TRADED DERIVATIVE
MARKETS
Despite the long history and relative simplicity of most derivatives, it was only within
the last thirty years that a significant OTC derivatives market emerged. 59 Perhaps sur-
prisingly, the OTC market's rapid explosion was in large part fueled by legal rather than
economic considerations.60 While financial institutions and commercial end-users were
undoubtedly aware of the theoretical benefits associated with employing OTC derivatives,
legal uncertainty historically inhibited the growth of privately negotiated agreements. 61
As the legal impediments to the development of OTC derivatives diminished though, the
market expanded into its current position as a major component of modern finance. 62 To
appreciate the significance of this development and growth within the OTC derivatives
market, however, it is necessary to understand how the OTC market is different from the
exchange traded markets. 63
Fundamentally, exchange trading is a rules-based endeavor. In order to trade on an
exchange, market participants must either become members of the exchange or trade
through a member of the exchange. 64 In both situations, the membership requirement
subjects the market's participants to the exchange's rules. Specifically, in addition to other
rules, the exchange may impose capital requirements on its members, limit a member's
ability to take speculative positions, impose loss-sharing obligations in the event of a
member default, and subject the members to reporting obligations. 65 In turn, many of the
market's rules both directly and indirectly trickle down to the member's clients (the end-
users). For example, an exchange's rules may limit the size of the positions that a member
can maintain with a client, impose higher margin requirements to cover the positions of a
member's client, or subject a member trading on a client's behalf to additional capital
requirements. 66 Perhaps the most significant implication of the rules-base system, how-
ever, is the fact that the exchanges determine which derivatives products to offer.67
Therefore, exchange trading limits the availability of derivative contracts to only those
with enough trading volume to cover the cost of establishing and managing the product.68
In contrast to the exchanges, decentralization is the hallmark of the OTC derivatives
market.69 In the OTC market, counterparties trade with one another directly using indi-
59. Garry J. Schinasi et al., Modern Banking and OTC Derivatives Markets: The Transformation of Global
Finance and its Implications for Systemic Risk 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 203, 2000); Duffie,
supra note 14, at 123-24.
60. See Schinasi et al., supra note 59, at 36.
61. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANcIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-
COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODrry EXCHANGE AcT 6, 10 (1999), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/otcact.pdf.
62. See Schinasi et al., supra note 59, at 1.
63. Id. at 18.
64. CASTAGNINo, supra note 19, at 13-14.
65. Schinasi et al., supra note 59, at 18.
66. Id.
67. CASTAGNINo, supra note 19, at 12-13.
68. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 9 ("Exchange trading relies on a relatively high order flow, due in
part to the cost of setting up exchange trading for each new type of derivative. Without enough trading,
these setup costs cannot be recovered from exchange and brokerage fees.").
69. Schinasi et al., supra note 59, at 19.
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vidually negotiated agreements. 70 Whereas exchanges provide for inflexible rules regard-
ing membership and trading activities, the participants in the OTC market are free to
make their own assessments regarding which parties to trade with, what types of margin
requirements to impose, and how to structure a particular transaction.7'
The increased flexibility of the OTC market though, is not without costs. In return for
the greater latitude to structure transactions that meet individual needs, the parties forgo
some of the benefits that exchange trading offers.72 In particular, the lack of standardiza-
tion between OTC derivatives decreases their marketability, thereby making it more diffi-
cult to close out a position merely by purchasing an offsetting contract.73 Additionally,
because the parties to the transaction individually negotiate each contract, they must en-
sure that the final agreement is both legally enforceable and an accurate reflection of what
they expect to accomplish through the derivative. 74
The need for individual negotiation in the OTC market, however, does not necessarily
mean that counterparties start each OTC derivative transaction from scratch. In fact,
trade organizations like the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) assist
contracting parties by establishing standardized documents and protocols, such as the
1992 ISDA Master Agreement and the various ISDA Definitions.75 By employing the
derivatives documentation provided by ISDA and other similar organizations, counterpar-
ties to OTC derivatives transactions are able to minimize the expense associated with
participation in the OTC market and, concurrently, benefit from the wealth of legal pre-
cedent regarding how various courts and attorneys have interpreted the agreements. For
example, ISDA regularly collects and updates legal opinions regarding the international
enforceability of netting and collateral provisions included in its derivatives documenta-
tion.76 ISDA members, by relying on such opinions, will gain some comfort regarding
how a foreign court may interpret and enforce the OTC derivative contract should its
counterparty become subject to an insolvency proceeding under the laws of another
country.77
The emergence of the OTC derivatives market as an alternative to the exchange trading
of derivatives was a significant development during the thirty years that preceded the fi-
nancial collapse of 2008. Without the advances in legal certainty for individually negoti-
ated derivatives transactions that occurred during that time, however, the OTC market
would probably not be as robust as it presently is. Subsequent to 1974, the most signifi-
cant legal barrier to the use and development of OTC derivatives was the uncertainty
70. 1 Goocii & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 3-4.
71. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 313-317.
72. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1465 (1993).
73. 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 3.
74. Id. at 4-5.
75. See generally ALLEN & OVERY LLP, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCUMENTATION OF OTC DERIV-
ATIVEs 3 (May 2002), http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/documentationofderivatives.pdf (discussing the de-
velopment and use of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement and other associated documents).
76. See id. at 5-6. As ofJanuary 2011, ISDA has collected netting opinions from counsel in fifty-five coun-
tries and collateral opinions from counsel in forty-five countries. Status of Collateral Opinions, Irr'L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVEs Ass'N, http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat-of.coll.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2011); Status ofNet-
ting Opinions, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVEs Ass'N, http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat.ofnetopin.htm (last
visited Jan. 13, 2011).
77. ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 75, at 5-6.
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associated with the scope of the CEA.'s According to a 1999 report on OTC derivatives
published by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, "uncertainty arises
from concerns under current law as to whether some of these contracts could be construed
to be subject to the CEA and whether certain types of mechanisms for executing and
clearing OTC derivatives might be construed to alter the legal status of otherwise ex-
empted or excluded instruments."79
As Transnor (Bermuda) Limited v. BP North American Petroleum illustrates, the concerns
of market participants regarding the legal treatment of OTC derivatives contracts under
the CEA during the 1980s and 1990s were not merely theoretical.80 In Tranmor, Shell
Oil, Conoco, and Exxon, along with other defendants, argued that certain Brent blend
crude oil contracts were exempt from regulation pursuant to the CEA's Forward Contract
Exclusion.81 According to the defendants, the absence of a contractual right to avoid the
parties' delivery obligations established their character as forward contracts. 82 The court,
however, disagreed and held that because they "were undertaken mainly to assume or shift
price risk without transferring the underlying commodity," the contracts were futures
even though they "may represent binding commitments to buy or sell the physical oil."83
By characterizing the contracts as futures rather than forwards, the court necessarily con-
cluded that the contracts were subject to the CFTC's regulatory authority and the re-
quirements of the CEA.84
Along with uncertainty associated with the scope of the CEA, competition between
regulatory authorities over the extent of their respective authority also served to stifle the
growth of the OTC derivatives market.85 As previously identified, the CEA grants the
CFTC the authority to regulate trading in commodity futures contracts.86 However, situ-
ations arose where it became difficult to determine whether a transaction at issue involved
a commodity or a security.87 These types of definitional challenges placed contracting
parties in the middle of conflicts between the CFTC and the SEC concerning the scope of
each agency's authority to regulate derivatives.88 Additionally, beyond merely being re-
quired to manage the jurisdictional challenges presented by SEC and CFTC conflicts,
78. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 61, at 6; see 1
JOHNSON & HAzEN, supra note 37, § 1.02[1 (discussing the implications associated with Congress's decision
to expand the definition of commodity through the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974).
79. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORIoI GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 61, at 6.
80. Transnor (Berm.) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
81. Id. at 1489; see 1 JOHNsON & HAZEN, supra note 37, § 1.02[31 (discussing the Forward Contract
Exclusion).
82. Transnor (Berm.) Ltd., 738 F. Supp. at 1491.
83. Id. at 1491, 1493.
84. Id. at 1491-93. In 1993, the CFTC used its newly acquired exemptive power to exclude the Brent blend
crude oil contracts from regulation as futures contracts. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2006); Exemption for Certain
Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,286, 21,294 (Apr. 20, 1993); REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETs, supra note 61, at 9.
85. Reade Everett, Deriving a Solution for Derivative Reform: Proposals to Reconstruct the Over-the-Counter
Derivative Markets, 28 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 479, 481 (2009).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 37 through 39.
87. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 61, at 7-8.
88. Id.; Everett, supra note 85. The possibility for conflict between the SEC and CFTC arose from amend-
ments to the CEA enacted in 1974 that (1) gave the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over commodity futures
contracts; (2) expanded the definition of commodity beyond tangible items; and (3) affirmed the existing
jurisdiction of the SEC. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra
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banking institutions were also obligated to cooperate with their various prudential regula-
tors, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve.89
During the last thirty years, however, Congress, through amendments to the CEA,
gradually removed the regulatory roadblocks that impeded the development of the OTC
derivatives market. Initially, in 1982 and 1983, Congress enacted amendments designed
to clarify the division of authority between the CFTC and the SEC and thereby reduce
the tension between the two regulatory bodies. 90 Subsequently, through the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1992, Congress gave the CFTC the authority to exempt certain
transactions from the scope of the CEA.91 Pursuant to its new exemptive authority, the
CFTC promulgated rules that excluded some swap agreements and energy-related con-
tracts from most of the CEA's requirements. 92 These CFTC rules provided the addi-
tional legal certainty necessary for the continued development of the OTC derivatives
market.93 However, because the exemptions enacted were administrative rather than stat-
utory, they remained subject to revocation by the CFTC and were therefore less than
ideal.94 Ultimately, by including sweeping statutory exemptions from the CEA in the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), Congress removed many of the
remaining barriers to the development and use of OTC derivatives.95 Following the en-
actment of the CFMA, "eligible contract participants"96 could enter into most derivative
transactions involving "excluded commodities"97 and "exempt commodities" 8 and indi-
note 61, at 7-8. The amendments "created conflicts regarding each agency's jurisdiction over novel financial
instruments that have elements of securities and futures or commodity options contracts." Id.
89. Schinasi et al., supra note 59, at 32.
90. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKErs, supra note 61, at 7-8.
The amendments essentially codified the "Shad-Johnson Accord" between the SEC and CFTC. The Accord
attempted to clarify which financial instruments were subject to which agency's jurisdiction. Eric J. Pan,
Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 221, 245 (2008). As
explained by the Seventh Circuit, however, Congress's allocation of authority between the SEC and CFTC
"appears to be a political compromise; no one has suggested an economic rationale for the distinction." Bd.
of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1999).
91. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 504, 106 Stat. 3590, 3629-31 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 6); Everett, supra note 85, at 482.
92. Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,286 (Apr. 20, 1993);
Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587 (ian. 22, 1993); see supra note 84.
93. 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 79-81 ("From the perspective of legal certainty, the Swap Agree-
ment Exemption and the Energy Contracts Exemption represented a significant improvement for the OTC
derivatives market.").
94. Id. at 81.
95. See id. at 67.
96. 7 U.S.C. § l(a)(12) (2006) (defining "eligible contract participant."). The definition of eligible contract
participant is designed to capture individuals and entities that, by virtue of their status, assets, organizational
structure, or wealth, are deemed to be sophisticated enough to not require the protection of the CEA. See id.
97. Id. § 2(d). The definition of excluded commodity generally includes "financial commodities as well as
certain other commodities without a cash market." Edward J. Rosen & Richard T. Kim, OTC Derivatives -
The Existing Regulatory Landscape, in ABCs oF SwAPs & OTHER DERWVATIVEs 2009, at 166-67; see 7 U.S.C.
§ 1a(13).
98. 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2006). Exempt commodities are commodities that are not excluded commodities or
agricultural commodities. 7 U.S.C. § la(14). Exempt commodities would "include such commodities as met-
als (precious, semiprecious and nonprecious), electricity, nonagricultural energy products, telecommunica-
tions bandwidth, telecommunications minutes, and emissions credits." Rosen & Kim, supra note 97, at 167.
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vidually negotiated transactions not involving agricultural commodities," without worry-
ing that the derivative agreement would be subject to the requirements of the CEA.ioo
As legal certainty regarding the use of bilaterally negotiated derivative products
emerged through legislative enactments and CFTC rulemaking, the market for OTC de-
rivatives exploded. According to information compiled by the Bank for International Set-
tlements, between the end of June 1998 and the end of June 2009, the total notional
amount outstanding for all OTC derivatives grew from $72 trillion to nearly $605 tril-
lion.IOI By contrast, at the end of 2009, the total notional amount outstanding for ex-
change-traded derivatives was only $73 trillion.102 With the rapid development of the
OTC derivatives market as an alternative to exchange trading, the scope of derivatives
products available to end-users for risk management purposes increased. 03 As the next
section explains, this expansion, combined with the ability to create additional custom
derivatives in the OTC market, permitted end-users to hedge risks that the traditional
exchanges did not reflect.
C. OTC DERIVATIVES AS TOOLS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
Although legal reform was necessary for the growth of the OTC derivatives market, it
was not the only factor that accounted for the market's rapid expansion. Ultimately, with-
out substantial demand for customized derivatives, the OTC market would not have
grown to over eight times the size of the exchange-traded derivatives market.'04 As ex-
plained by Robert Pickel, ISDA's Chief Executive Officer, "the need for these privately
negotiated derivatives products was driven by the needs of end-users. Their growth was a
direct function of their utility to end-users. If end-users did not want these products, they
would not exist." 05
For many commercial end-users, the principal utility of OTC derivatives comes from
their value as tools for managing risk.'0 6 To illustrate this point, in testimony before the
99. 7 U.S.C. § 2(g). Significantly, in conjunction with the implementation of central clearing and other
financial reforms, the Dodd-Frank Act repeals many of the exemptions established with the CFMA. Agricul-
tural Commodity Definition, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,586 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
100. For a more complete discussion of the nuances of the CFMA exemptions, see I GOOCH & KLEIN, supra
note 23, at 82-101.
101. Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-June 2009, BIS Q. REv., Dec. 2010, available at http://
www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dtl920a.pdf; see infra text accompanying notes 137 through 142 (explaining the
difference between total and net notional amounts outstanding).
102. Stefan Avdjiev & Christian Upper, Highlights ofInternational Banking and Financial Market Activity, in
BIS Q. REv., Mar. 2010, at 23, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/rqtl003.pdf.
103. Hearing on the Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs. S. Comm. on Capital Mks., Ins., and Gov't Regulation, Illth Cong. 178 (2009) (written testimony of
Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives Association).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 101 through 102.
105. Hearing on the Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on
Financial Services Sub. Comm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov't Regulation, 11I th Cong. (2009) (written
testimony of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives Association).
106. See I JonNsoN & THzEN, supra note 37, § 1.02[12A] (Supp. 2010) ("Nearly all of the over-the-counter
derivatives arose out of the desire to moderate risk"); Hu, supra note 72, at 1465-66 ("[P]erhaps most impor-
tant, derivatives enable end-users to transfer or modulate their market risks."). It would be disingenuous,
however, to suggest that end-users only employ OTC derivatives for hedging risks. In fact, many entities also
enter into OTC derivatives for speculative purposes. See Bd. of Trade of Chicago, 187 F.3d at 716 ("[A] person
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House Agricultural Committee, Cargill's Director of Federal Government Relations iden-
tified how Cargill, an "international provider of food, agricultural, and risk management
products and services," helped end-users manage risk through customized derivatives:
We offer customized hedges to help bakeries manage the price volatility of their flour
so that their retail prices for baked goods can be as stable as possible. We issue criti-
cal hedges to help regional New England heating oil distributors manage price spikes
and volatility on their purchases so they can offer families stable prices throughout
the winter season. And we offer customized hedges to help a restaurant chain main-
tain stable prices on chicken so the company can offer consistent prices and value to
their retail customers when selling chicken sandwiches. 07
Essentially, commercial end-users employ derivatives in order to minimize their exposure
to undesirable fluctuations in market rates or prices. 08 In some situations, an end-user
can adequately accomplish its risk management objectives through the application of ex-
change-traded derivatives alone. However, the effectiveness of exchange-traded deriva-
tives as hedges is limited when the asset hedged does not precisely match the underlying
of the contract, the contract's underlying amount is different from the amount that the
end-user is attempting to hedge, or the timing of the contract does not match the timing
needs of the end user.109 For example, a live cattle futures contract offered on the Chi-
cago Board of Trade is an imperfect hedge for a steakhouse chain that sells "Prime" steaks.
An example of "quality risk," the underlying-"55% Choice, 45% Select, Yield Grade 3
live steers"-only serves as a rough proxy for the restaurant's demand for grill-ready
prime beef. 0 As the quality, quantity, and timing risks associated with the available ex-
change traded products increase in significance, the utility of the derivative to the end-
user breaks down.III
Through customization of the derivative contract, however, the end-user can avoid the
quality, quantity, and timing risks presented by exchange-traded products.112 Returning
who wants to obtain the returns (and take the risks) of particular market segments . . . could purchase an
appropriate combination of futures contracts."); RobertJ. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Mod-
ern Prudent Investor Rule: Too Risky or Too Necessary, 67 OHo ST. L.J. 525, 552-556 (2006) (discussing the
difference between speculating and hedging with derivatives and noting that a speculator is "a trader who
enters the derivatives market with an intention to seek profit by willingly accepting increased risk" while "a
hedger is a trader who enters the market with an intention to reduce or eliminate a preexisting risk."); Hu,
supra note 72, at 1466 (noting that "end users may be able to arbitrage differences between the price of the
derivative and the price of the underlying asset, or between prices in different capital markets").
107. Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By the US. Department of the Treasury Regarding the Regulation of
Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (testimony of
Jon Hixson, Director of Federal Government Relations, Cargill, Inc.).
108. CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 2; Hu, supra note 72, at 1465-66. As explained by Professor Hu,
"[dlerivatives can insulate end-users from exogenous risks-a derivative that rises in value if oil prices fall
could protect a sheikdom, while one that rises along with oil prices will insulate an airline. End-users may
prefer a world where their market risks have, in effect, gone away." Hu, supra note 72, at 1466.
109. JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 320-21 (these three hedging risks are known as "quality risk," "quantity
risk," and "timing risk").
110. Live Cattle Futures, supra note 41; see JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 320.
111. See JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 319-21.
112. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Erpectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate
Objective, 73 TEx. L. REv. 985, 986 (1995). In a particularly eloquent passage, Professor Hu explains that
"with the emergence of the modern derivative, corporations need no longer take the world as it is. ... In
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to the steakhouse illustration, with an OTC derivative product the restaurant chain can
contract for an underlying (or underlyings) that more accurately reflects the products it
purchases, quantities that match its actual demand, and a timing schedule that corresponds
to the frequency of its purchases.'" 3 With the ability to negotiate regarding the provisions
of the derivative product, the end-user can implement a near-perfect hedge or, alterna-
tively, selectively expose itself to the amount and type of risk that it is willing to accept.'14
Interest rate derivatives, which account for roughly seventy-two percent of the OTC
market by notional amount outstanding, are one of the most important derivative prod-
ucts available to end-users and are a relatively straightforward vehicle for illustrating the
benefits of customization.115 By employing a derivative tied to interest rates, an end-user
can hedge against the risk that an interest rate of concern will move in a direction that is
not to its advantage. To understand how the derivative would operate as hedge, assume
that XYZ Company plans to borrow $15 million from a bank.11 6 Under the terms of the
loan agreement, depicted in Figure 2, XYZ Company will be obligated to make annual
interest payments to the bank at a floating rate equal to the one year LIBOR plus three
percent for a period of ten years.
Figure 2. XYZ Company Loan
XYZ Company Floating (LIBOR +3%) > Bank
,on $15 million
After completing the borrowing, one of XYZ Company's major concerns will be its
interest rate risk. Specifically, if the one-year LIBOR increases during the life of the loan,
XYZ Company's borrowing cost will grow significantly. To hedge this interest rate risk,
the company may elect to enter into an interest rate swap with a derivatives dealer
(Dealer)." 7 Effectively, the swap will insulate XYZ Company from changes to LIBOR by
"converting" its floating rate obligation of LIBOR plus three percent into a fixed rate
effect, corporations can increasingly determine the market and legal environment in which they will operate.
If clever and careful enough, a corporation can avoid the chaos of the real world. A corporation can enter a
private 'derivative reality,' a synthetic world purged of risks it deems undesirable." Id.
113. See 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that "the buyer can design a transaction involving
the amounts, settlement dates, and underlying instruments or commodities that it wishes without being con-
strained by the standardized terms of the exchange-traded products.").
114. See CRAwFORD & SmN, supra note 19, at 100. By hedging only one-half of its beef requirement, our
hypothetical steakhouse will lock-in the price for that fraction, but remain exposed to price fluctuations for
the rest of the beef it purchases.
115. See rupra notes 44 to 49.
116. For similar examples of interest rate swaps, see CAsTAGNINo, supra note 19, at 54-57; 1 GOOCH &
KLEIN, supra note 23, at 421-22; JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 537-38.
117. See JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 483. In fact, some credit agreements may require that the borrower
enter into an interest rate derivative in order to hedge the interest rate risk associated with the loan. RICH-
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obligation.' 18 Assuming that XYZ Company would be comfortable paying a fixed rate of
five percent on its loan, it will commit to annually exchange payments equal to two per-
cent applied to a notional principal amount of $15 million with Dealer (the swap
counterparty) in return for payments equal to one-year LIBOR applied to the $15 million
notional amount. Figure 3 illustrates the payment exchanges between the swap
counterparties." 9 By negotiating for a notional amount equal to the actual amount of its
loan, XYZ Company will fully hedge its interest rate risk.120
Figure 3. XYZ Company Interest Rate Swap
Fixed (2%)
on notional $15 million
XYZ Company Dealer
Floating (LIBOR)
on notional $15 million
If on the first payment date the one-year LIBOR has risen to five percent, then XYZ
Company will owe the bank an interest payment of eight percent (LIBOR + three percent)
on its $15 million loan. However, when XYZ Company and Dealer net their obligations
under the interest rate swap, Dealer will owe XYZ Company three percent of the notional
amount of $15 million.121 As Figure 4 indicates, Dealer's payment of three percent on the
notional amount compensates XYZ Company for the interest above five percent that it
must pay to the bank pursuant to the terms of its loan agreement.122 Regardless of
whether LIBOR increases or decreases, by evaluating the payments under the loan agree-
ment and the swap together, XYZ Company effectively only ever pays an interest rate of
five percent on its $15 million loan.
ARD WRIGHT, WARREN Coox & RICHARD GRAY, THE LSTA's COMPLETE CREDrr AGREEMENT GUIDE
332-34 (2009).
118. See 1 GOOcH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 421.
119. Figure 3 is derived from a similar figure in 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 421.
120. This example assumes that the principle amount of the loan remains constant during the life of the
loan. If the loan required principle payments prior to maturity, the interest rate swap agreement could pro-
vide for a decreasing notional amount so that the principle amount of the loan and the notional amount of the
swap remained the same. See CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 56.
121. See INT'L SWAPs AND DERIVATIVEs Ass'N, supra note 49.
122. Figure 4 is derived from a similar figure in 1 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 23, at 422.
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Figure 4. XYZ Company Combined Interest Rate Swap and Loan
Fixed = 2%
on notional $15 million
XYZ Company Dealer
ly Floating (LIBOR) = 5%
on notional $15 million
Floating (LIBOR +3%) = 8%
on $15 million
Bank
In a CDS, another common swap transaction, the end-user hedges against the possibil-
ity that an entity will default on an obligation identified as the underlying for the CDS
contract. In effect, the CDS operates like an insurance contract by transferring the default
risk of the "reference entity" from the "protection buyer" to the "protection seller."l 23 In
structuring the terms of the CDS, the counterparties will identify a notional amount of an
obligation of the reference entity as the underlying and the credit events that the agree-
ment will cover.124 For example, a party that holds S10 million of a borrower's unsecured
debt may hedge against the risk that the borrower will default by purchasing a CDS with
an equivalent notional amount of the borrower's unsecured debt as its underlying.125
During the term of the CDS, the protection buyer agrees to make periodic payments
equal to the contract's "CDS rate" multiplied by the notional amount of the underly-
123. Duffie, supra note 14, at 124. A CDS contract however, is not true insurance. Generally, credit insur-
ance is an indemnity contract that requires the insured to have an insurable interest and only pays out in the
event of an actual loss. A CDS, on the other hand, does not include an insurable interest requirement and
pays when the credit event occurs regardless of actual loss. See Christopher L. Culp, Credit Risk Management
Lessons From Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC PoLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF
ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS 211, 218-21 (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds.,
2003); Andrea S. Kramer & Alton B. Harris, Credit Derivatives Post-Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK:
THE PUBLIC PoucY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONs 236,
246-47 (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003).
124. Donald A. Bendernagel et al., Credit Derivatives: Usage, Practice and Issues, in ADVANCED SWAPS &
OTHER DERIVATIVES 343 (2009). Credit events covered by the CDS contract may include, among others,
principal shortfalls, principal write-downs, interest shortfalls, and rating downgrades. BRIAN P. LANCASTER
ET AL., STRUCTURED PRODUCTS AND RELATED CREDrr DERIVATIVES: A CoMPREHENsIVE GUIDE FOR
INVESTORs 376 (2008); GARY L. GASrTINEAU & MARK P. KnrrZMAN, DicTIoNARY OF FINANCIAL RISK
MANAGEMENT 86 (1999).
125. See Duffie, supra note 14, at 124.
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ing.126 In return, the protection seller agrees that if the credit event occurs, it will pay the
protection buyer either (1) the difference between the notional amount of the CDS and
the market value of the debt or (2) the full notional amount of the CDS in return for
equivalent amount of the borrower's debt.127
As the interest rate swap and CDS contract examples suggest, customizable derivatives
provide a vast array of opportunities for the mitigation of different types of risk. Further-
more, the availability of OTC derivatives ensures that decisions regarding the type and
quantity of risk to mitigate rest with the end-user of the product.128 For example, in the
interest rate swap illustration, XYZ Company may accept a portion of the risk that LI-
BOR will increase by negotiating for a notional amount less than the principal amount of
its loan. The difference between the notional and principle amount would reflect the
amount of the loan still subject to interest rate risk. Similarly, an entity entering into a
CDS may elect to remain exposed to some types of credit risks by excluding them from
the credit events covered by the swap.12 9
Ultimately, the importance of the OTC derivatives market stems from its value to end-
users attempting to manage the risks associated with their respective lines of business.130
The expansion of the decentralized OTC derivatives market as an alternative to the for-
mal and rules-based exchange-traded derivatives markets, provided end-users with the
ability to structure agreements uniquely tailored to their own requirements and risk toler-
ances.131 But, the market would not have been possible without the improvements in
regulatory certainty that permitted the development and growth of customizable deriva-
tive products.132 While the customized products that emerged were, at their core, funda-
mentally just variations of the four basic derivative types-forwards, futures, swaps, and
options-the growth of OTC market itself resulted in an incredibly complex network of
counterparty relationships.133 As the recent financial crisis demonstrated, without proper
controls, the interconnectedness within the OTC market has the potential to produce
systemic instability across the financial system.134 It is in response to this systemic insta-
bility that central clearing, to which this paper now turns, is offered as a solution.
III. Central Clearing in the OTC Derivatives Market
A. THE FRAMEWORK OF CENTRAL CLEARING
In conjunction with recognizing the significance of the role that OTC derivatives play
in risk management, it is important to understand that the derivative transactions them-
126. Id. For example, a CDS rate of 300 basis points would require that the protection buyer make payments
equal to three-percent of the notional obligation.
127. Bendernagel et al., sapra note 124, at 347.
128. ScImNAsi, spra note 6, at 195-96.
129. See LANCASTER ET AL., supra note 124, at 76-77.
130. See spra notes 105 to 107.
131. Scm-INAsi, supra note 6, at 195-96, 200-01.
132. See spra notes 90 through 100.
133. See SCHINASI, spra note 6, at 211.
134. See Duffie, Li & Lubke, spra note 5, at 1.
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selves do not eliminate risk.13s Rather, the derivative product at the heart of the transac-
tion merely transfers risks from one party to another.136 As entities continuously alter the
distribution of risk across the market by entering into new derivatives, the total notional
amount outstanding necessarily increases.137 Interestingly, this growth in the notional
amount outstanding gives the appearance that the total risk is also increasing. 38 Fortu-
nately, the appearance is incorrect. Entities participating in the OTC derivatives market
frequently enter into offsetting transactions in order to net their total exposure.139 By
entering into an offsetting transaction, the entity doubles the notional amount outstand-
ing but does not alter the total amount of risk within the system.14o To illustrate this
point, according to Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) data for the
week ending March 5, 2010, 3,524 CDS contracts identified Ford Motor Company as the
reference entity-a total notional amount outstanding of $28.3 billion.14' After account-
ing for offsetting transactions, however, the net notional amount outstanding for the CDS
contracts was under $1.9 billion-less than ten percent of the total.142
Although repeatedly transferring risk between parties does not increase the aggregate
risk in the system, it certainly does increase the interconnectedness of the market place.143
Given the highly decentralized nature of the OTC derivatives market, the process of man-
aging risk through customized derivatives has generated a complex network of relation-
ships between entities. 44 As explained by Professor Hu, "the price of contractual freedom
is a greater risk of default."145 By carefully selecting their counterparties however, partici-
pants in the OTC derivatives market seek to minimize the hazards associated with becom-
ing part of this web.146 But individual efforts to minimize such "counterparty risk" are of
only limited value if systemically important institutions threaten the stability of the entire
system.147 To address the hazards stemming from the concentration of large derivative
positions in systemically important institutions, many commentators suggested that Con-
135. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 37, § 1.02[3] (describing how a hedging transaction produces
opposite results for the transaction's counterparties).
136. Dodd, supra note 6.
137. See The Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111 th Cong. 15-





141. Trade Information Warehouse Data, Top 1,000 Reference Entities (Gros and Net Notional) for Week End-
ing 2010-03-05, DEPOSITORY TRUST AND CLEARINsG CORPORATION (on file with author).
142. Id.
143. See ScHmNAsi, supra note 6, at 187.
144. Id.
145. Hu, supra note 72.
146. See CAsrAGNINo, supra note 19, at 183.
147. See Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform, FIN. STABILYTY BD., Oct. 25, 2010, at 9, available at
http-//www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf (noting that a dealer's default and the cor-
responding losses to such dealer's counterparties "may lead to a situation in which other market participants
become unable to perform on their own obligations to other counterparties[,]" which, in turn, "could trigger
a chain of credit-related losses ... and, in the worst scenarios, potentially cause a chain of defaults.").
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gress enact legislation making central clearing mandatory in the OTC derivatives
market. 148
Central clearing in the OTC derivatives market involves inserting a central
counterparty (CCP) between the original parties to the derivative transaction through the
process of novation.149 Essentially, by becoming "a buyer to every seller and a seller to
every buyer," a CCP assumes the financial responsibility for the transaction. 50 As Figure
5 illustrates,15 central clearing has the potential to simplify the interconnectedness of the
OTC derivatives market by converting it into a "hub-and-spoke" system.152 Once the
original counterparties clear the derivative through the CCP, they no longer face the risk
that the other may default before settlement.15 3 Further, because the novation creates
offsetting positions for the CCP-assuming that both parties satisfy their obligations to
the CCP-the CCP does not incur any risk of losses or gains from fluctuations in the
underlying.' 54 The CCP's principal concern is that by accepting the novation of multiple
derivatives contracts, it concentrates the counterparty risk associated with the transactions
in itself; i.e., the CCP bears the burden of either counterparty's default in every transac-
tion it clears.155
148. See, e.g., Hearing on OTC Derivatives Reform and Addressing Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, I11th Cong. 1 (2009) (written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Trea-
sury Secretary of the United States); I JOHNSON & HAzEN, supra note 37, § 1.02[12A] (Supp. 2010); John D.
Ciorciari, Key Principles and Recommendations, in THE ROAD AHEAD FOR THE FED 189, 201 (John D. Ciorciari
& John B. Taylor eds., 2009).
149. See CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 15 (addressing central clearing in the context of exchange trading).
150. Philipp Haene & Andy Sturm, Optimal Central Counterparty Risk Management 3 (Swiss National Bank,
Working Paper No. 2009-7, 2009), available at http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/work-
ing-paper_2009_07/source. Although often used interchangeably, there is a conceptual difference between a
central counterparty and a clearinghouse. A clearinghouse can provide clearing services as an agent of the
counterparties rather than as a principal to the transaction while a CCP by definition assumes the financial
responsibility for the transaction through novation. TINA P. HASENPUSCH, CLEARING SERVICES FOR
GLOBAL MARKETs § 2.1.3 (2009).
151. Figure 5 is based on a similar figure in Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 6.
152. Id.
153. CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 15; Richard Heffner, The Regulation of Multilateral Clearing in the United
Kingdom and United States, in EXCHANGES AND ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYsTEMS 97, 98 (Dick Frase &
Helen Parry eds., 2002) (noting that the counterparty risk shifts to the CCP only when the transactions
become binding).
154. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 7. That is, each novation generates an equivalent a long position
and short position for the CCP.
155. Haene & Sturm, supra note 150.
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Figure 5. Counterparty Relationships Without and With a CCP
A A
E B E TB
CCP
D C D C
To handle the increase in concentration of counterparty risk, a CCP will implement
procedures intended to ensure its own stability in the event that any other entity with
which it interacts defaults.156 A CCP accomplishes this counterparty risk management
through the application of three related devices: membership, margin requirements, and
guarantee funds.157 First, any party that desires to clear its OTC derivatives directly must
become a clearing member (CM) of the CCP.s8 By limiting membership to only the
most creditworthy market participants, the CCP minimizes the risk that any counterparty
will default on the obligations that it establishes with the CCP.159 For a market partici-
pant that is not a member of the CCP, central clearing requires finding a CM willing to
interact with and clear trades through the CCP on such market participant's behalf.160
While the purpose of the membership requirement is to minimize the chance that a
CM will default, the objective of the margin requirements is to limit a CCP's loss in the
event that a CM does default. 161 The margining requirements of CCPs are premised on
the "defaulter-pays" principle: losses incurred by the CCP while unwinding the defaulting
CM's positions should be borne by the CM.162 When CMs submit a trade to a CCP for
clearing, the CCP will require that the original parties provide two types of margin: initial
margin and variation margin.163 The purpose of the initial margin is to facilitate the
CCP's efforts to unwind the position following a default by covering any losses sustained
by the CCP during the unwinding process.164 Thus, the amount of initial margin that
CMs must provide when they first submit a trade to the CCP for clearing depends on the
156. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 6.
157. Id.
158. HAsENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.3.1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. § 2.1.2.2.1.3.
162. Haene & Sturm, supra note 150.
163. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 7.
164. Id. at 7-8. Initial margin reflects the possibility that a defaulting CM may not post the variation margin
necessary to cover the fluctuations in market value of the CM's positions while the CCP liquidates such
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type of derivative and the size of the position.s65 Ideally, the amount "should exceed, in
most extreme scenarios, the change in [the position's] market value" over the time that it
would take the CCP to conduct the liquidation.166 In contrast to the initial margin, which
the CCP calculates only once, the parties reassess their variation margin requirements on
a daily basis.167 Effectively, the variation margin reflects the CM's unrealized profit or
loss with the CCP as the market value of the position changes.168
In contrast to the margin obligations, a CCP's guarantee fund requirements reflect a
"survivor-pays" principle.169 By requiring each CM to contribute to a collective guarantee
fund, the CCP is able to distribute any losses that exceed the defaulting CM's margin
across all of the non-defaulting CMs.17o Guarantee funds essentially give CCPs an addi-
tional layer of resources with which to protect their financial stability while managing the
consequences of a CM's default. 171 In theory, the margining requirements will be suffi-
cient to allow the CCP to unwind a CM's positions under normal market conditions while
the guarantee fund stands ready to cover defaults that occur during more extreme
situations.172
By creating a rigorous system for managing risk and successfully unwinding positions
when necessary, CCPs establish themselves as stable and important components of the
OTC derivatives market. 73 Assuming that CCPs remain capable of managing their
counterparty's positions during the liquidation process, the hub and spoke system may
insulate the remainder of the market from the collapse of any individual systemically im-
portant firm.174 As the next section explains, by simplifying the interconnectedness of the
OTC derivatives market, financially secure CCPs may help reduce the systemic risk
presented by institutions that maintain large OTC derivatives positions.
positions. In such a situation, the losses incurred by the CCP during the liquidation will be absorbed by the
initial margin of the CM. Id.
165. Id. For example, positions that are less liquid, larger in size, subject to greater daily variability, or likely
to become illiquid in the event of a default will require larger initial margins than those that are small, capable
of being liquidated quickly, and only experience minimal variations in market value. Id.
166. Id.
167. HASENPUSCii, supra note 150, § 2.1.2.2.1.3.
168. Id.
169. Haene & Sturm, supra note 150.
170. Id.
171. See Financial Resources Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,113
(proposed Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39 and 140). Under the rules proposed by the
CFIC, a CCP would absorb any losses it sustains beyond the margin posted by the defaulting CM first
through its own first-loss capital and then subsequently with guarantee funds submitted by non-defaulting
CMs. Id.
172. HAsENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.1.2.2.1.3.
173. See Financial Resources Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,113
(proposed Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39 and 140). The rule proposed by the CFTC
would require a CCP to have financial resources sufficient "to meet its financial obligations to its clearing
members notwithstanding a default by the clearing member creating the largest financial exposure for the
(CCP] in extreme but plausible market conditions." Id.
174. See Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Settlement: A Comparison of Central
Counterparties and Alternative Stnctures, 30 EcON. PERSPECTIVEs 22, 25-26 (2006) (explaining that "Islince
the CCP is the only direct counterparty of a clearing member, it effectively acts on behalf of the other,
nondefaulting clearing members in pursuing legal remedies against any clearing member that defaults.").
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B. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF CENTRAL CLEARING
Proponents of central clearing argue that requiring central clearing for certain OTC
derivatives contracts will promote the stability of the entire financial system.175 Specifi-
cally, by introducing a CCP between the original counterparties to derivative contracts,
the parties no longer face the counterparty risk of the other. Instead, the counterparty
risk shifts to the CCP-an entity designed to be more stable than either of the individual
counterparties alone.176 Further, as additional market participants submit their trades to
the CCP for clearing, the CCP's ability to facilitate the reduction of counterparty expo-
sures through the process of multilateral netting increases.' 77 To appreciate the benefits
that these two aspects of central clearing provide though, it is first necessary to understand
how reliance on bilateral clearing can promote instability in the financial system.
In the OTC derivatives markets, derivatives dealers attempt to maintain neutral posi-
tions with respect to the market risk of the derivative contracts they sell.178 To accomplish
this goal, dealers frequently enter into offsetting transactions with end-users or other de-
rivatives dealers.179 For example, if a dealer is the floating rate payer in an interest rate
swap with an end-user, it may attempt to offset its own exposure to the interest rate by
positioning itself as the fixed rate payer in a similar transaction with a different end-user
or another dealer.1s 0 By maintaining the offsetting positions, the dealer reduces its expo-
sure to the change in the market for the underlying. However, because the dealer is now
exposed to two counterparties rather than one, the decreased market risk came at the cost
of increased counterparty risk1s1
The process whereby dealers continuously enter into offsetting transactions to mitigate
market risk results in a precarious balance. To maintain market neutral positions, deriva-
tive dealers inevitably acquire large portfolios of offsetting derivatives.182 In return for the
relatively neutral positions they achieve, however, each accumulates potentially significant
exposures to other dealers.S3 In such a market, the failure of a major participant can
result in substantial losses for the counterparties of such market participant.184 This ag-
175. See, e.g., Hearing on OTC Derivatives Reform and Addressing Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, I11th Cong. 1 (2009) (written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Trea-
sury Sec'y of the United States).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 156 through 172.
177. Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 174, at 26; Heffner, supra note 153, at 101.
178. Robert R. Bliss & George R. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout 9-
10, n.14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2005-03, 2005) (although called "dealers,"
financial intermediaries in the OTC derivatives markets do not truly buy and sell derivatives contracts.
Rather, the dealers are "derivatives portfolio managers who dynamically manage large books, deriving income
from bid-offer spreads, while seeking to remain 'market neutral' by appropriately controlling their
exposures.").
179. Hearing on The Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on
Financial Servs. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Regulation, I 11th Cong. (2009) (writ-
ten testimony of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives Association).
180. Cf CASTAGNINO, supra note 19, at 11-12.
181. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 174, at 26.
182. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 178, at 9-10; see Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that prior to
2007, "active market participants typically held large simultaneous long and short CDS positions referencing
the same underlying borrower.").
183. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 178, at 10.
184. See Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 5.
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gregation of counterparty credit risk becomes a systemic risk issue when the losses
counterparties may suffer because of a market participant's failure would be sufficient to
threaten their own stability. 85 In fact, even the widespread belief that a counterparty will
fail can generate conditions in the bilateral OTC derivatives market that contribute to
such counterparty's actual failure.186 Specifically, if parties believe that their counterparty
will default, they may attempt to avoid losses by reducing their exposure to the failing
firm.87 The sudden movement away from the counterparty can exacerbate the firm's
already threatened position and hasten its collapse.18"
Central clearing of OTC derivatives promises to decrease the systemic risk that stems
from the aggregation of counterparty risk in large institutions.' 89 By inserting the CCP as
the "buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer," the parties to a transaction no longer
face the credit risk of their original counterparty.190 Rather, the parties become subject to
the credit risk of the CCP alone.191 Effectively, the parties substitute the higher quality
and homogenous credit risk of the CCP for the variable credit risk of the individual
counterparties.192 In the event that an original counterparty defaults, the novation to the
CCP protects the other counterparty from the consequences of the default.193 Further-
more, because the original counterparties rely on the CCP for performance, central clear-
ing eliminates the need for market participants to avoid losses by distancing themselves
from CMs that are apparently failing.'94 If the CCP's risk management practices are suffi-
cient to ensure its own stability while it conducts an orderly resolution of a defaulting
CM's positions, other CMs will remain confident that any such default will not seriously
threaten the creditworthiness of the CCP itself.195
Along with reducing the systemic risk presented by the aggregation of credit risk, pro-
ponents of central clearing also argue that the process will decrease the overall amount of
outstanding obligations for the types of derivatives subject to central clearing.196 In a
bilateral clearing market, counterparties managing their positions occasionally create sets
of trades where the total obligations between multiple parties are offsetting.9 7 For exam-
ple, if Dealer A has a $10 million exposure to Dealer B, Dealer B has a $10 million expo-
sure to Dealer C, and Dealer C has a $10 million exposure to Dealer A through similar
derivative transactions, the net of the obligations between the parties is $0. However,
because these transactions involve three different counterparties, the redundant positions
185. See id.; GAsrIM~u & KrrzMAN, supra note 124, at 307. Systemic risk is the "[r]isk associated with
the general health or structure of the financial system" and is "[a]lmost invariably discussed in terms of the
system's inability to handle large quantities of market, credit, or (most likely) settlement risk." Id.
186. See Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 5.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 11; Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 178, at 10.
189. See Duffle, supra note 14, at 126.
190. Haene & Sturm, supra note 150; HAsENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.2.2.1.
191. Duffie, supra note 14, at 126.
192. HAsFNPusCH, supra note 150, § 2.2.2.1; Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 174, at 26; Heffner, supra note
153, at 101.
193. Haene & Sturm, supra note 150.
194. See Duffle, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 11-12.
195. Id. at 12.
196. Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 174, at 26.
197. See Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 19-20.
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are difficult to identify and cancel. 198 As a result, the payment obligations frequently re-
main active and contribute to the complexity of the marketplace while each participant
remains subject to the counterparty risk of the others. 199
Under a central clearing regime, the CCP is able to identify and address the opportuni-
ties for multilateral netting between the CMs. 200 By netting transactions on a multilateral
rather than bilateral basis, the CCP can reduce the total payment obligations of the deriv-
atives while simultaneously reducing the counterparty risk from the trades.201 As Dealer
A, Dealer B, and Dealer C submit their offsetting trades to the CCP for clearing, the
obligations created between the CCP and each dealer through the novation of the trades
cancel one another.202 Thus, the multilateral netting conducted by the CCP between the
CMs eliminates both the payment obligations and the counterparty risk between the vari-
ous dealers. 203
Although significant, the reduction of systemic risk through effective counterparty
credit risk management and multilateral netting are not the only benefits associated with
central clearing. For example, proponents of central clearing often identify increased
transparency and economies of scale as additional advantages of central clearing of OTC
derivatives. 204 But the alleged benefits of central clearing of OTC derivatives are, in large
part, theoretical rather than proven.205 As the next part of this article will explain, in
implementing the mandatory central clearing requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act, regu-
lators must assess how the predicted benefits associated with central clearing will measure
up against the potential costs.
IV. The Hazards of Central Clearing
A. STRUCTURE OF DODD-FRANK ACT PROVISIONS FOR CENTRAL CLEARING
In response to the financial collapse that occurred in late 2008, members of Congress
introduced a myriad of bills designed to overhaul the financial services industry.206 Uti-
198. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 174, at 26 ("Mhe information needed to accomplish multilateral
netting may include proprietary information that the traders involved may not wish to share with outsiders.
That concern may inhibit the cooperation and disclosure needed in the bilateral markets to accomplish multi-
lateral netting.").
199. Id.; see I JOHNSON & HAzN.s, supra note 37, § 1.02 [12A] (supp. 2010) (noting that "any interruption in
the orderly flow of funds between the parties can result in actual or technical breaches.").
200. Duffic, supra note 14, at 126.
201. HASENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.2.2.1.
202. See Working Paper on Exchanges and Post Trade Services: An Overview 9 (Competition Comm'n Working
Paper, 2005), http://www.competition-comission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2005/Ase/industry-background-paper.
pdf.
203. See id.; Heffner, supra note 153, at 101.
204. See id.; Everett, supra note 85, at 486-87 (noting that communication between the CCP and regulators
will allow regulators "to exercise full effectiveness in protecting the integrity of the markets").
205. Cf Duffle, supra note 14, at 130-31 (noting that recent research suggests that central clearing can
actually increase systemic risk).
206. See, e.g., Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, Illth Cong. (2010); Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009); Derivative Trading Account-
ability and Disclosure Act of 2009, H.R. 3300, 11Ith Cong. (2009); Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act,
H.R. 3145, 11Ith Cong. (2009); Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act, S. 961, 111th Cong. (2009); Finan-
cial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1754, 111th Cong. (2009).
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mately, many of these bills stood little chance of reaching a vote by the full Senate or
House of Representatives. 207 Other proposals, however, were eventually reconciled and
merged into the enacted Dodd-Frank Act.208 To provide context necessary to evaluate the
potential hazards of mandatory central clearing, this section will briefly outline the central
clearing requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.209 Considering the importance of the
OTC derivatives, the Dodd-Frank Act provisions mandating central clearing have the po-
tential to generate far-reaching consequences for financial stability and risk management
strategies.
Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act's defined terms is the necessary starting point of
any effort to determine the scope and application of the mandatory central clearing re-
quirements. In particular, the applicability of the clearing provisions essentially turn on
whether (1) the counterparties to the transaction are "Swap Dealer[s]" or "Major Swap
Participant[s]" and (2) the transaction meets the definition of a "Swap."210 Significantly,
the Dodd-Frank Act (1) distinguishes between "Swaps" and "Security-Based Swaps" and
(2) assigns regulatory authority over clearing requirements for each to the CFTC and
SEC respectively.211 Thus, although the Dodd-Frank Act's requirements are substan-
tively identical, it addresses Swaps clearing through amendments to the CEA but in-
troduces the provisions regarding Security-Based Swaps as amendments to Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.212 By expansively defining the terms Swap and Security-Based
Swap to include most options and swap transactions, along with any agreement that subse-
quently becomes commonly known as a swap, the Dodd-Frank Act ensures that the clear-
ing requirements are broadly applicable and capture the different types of derivative
products that currently exist or that may arise in the future.213
For derivative products that are a Swap-as the Dodd-Frank Act defines the term-the
applicability of the clearing requirements first depends on whether the counterparties to
the transactions are a "Swap Dealer" or "Major Swap Participant." In general, the Act
specifies that parties who, "as an ordinary course of business," enter into swaps for such
207. For example, Representative Waters' bill, the Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act of 2009, has lan-
guished in the House Committee on Financial Services since July 9, 2009. Credit Default Swap Prohibition
Act, H.R. 3145, 111th Cong. (2009) (bill status available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?dlIl:HR3145:@@@X (last visited Jan. 2011)).
208. H.R. 4173 (as passed by House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 2009); S. 3217 (as passed by the Senate).
209. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. VII, 124 Stat. 1376, 1601-802 (2010).
210. Id. § 723(a)(2) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2).
211. See id. § 721(a)(19), (21) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § la). A Security-Based Swap is a Swap, as defined
under the Dodd-Frank Act, that is based on a narrow index of securities, the securities of a single issuer, or on
events related to a single issuer or a narrow index of issuers. Id. § 761(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)). Included within Security-Based Swaps and Swaps is a subcategory known as "Mixed Swaps." Id. A
Mixed Swap is, essentially, a Security-Based Swap that includes attributes that would otherwise cause it to fit
within the definition of Swap. See id. Because the transactions do not fit neatly within the jurisdiction of the
CFTC or SEC alone, Congress elected to subject Mixed Swaps to the joint regulatory oversight of both
agencies. Id. § 712(a)(8).
212. Compare id. § 713(a), witb id. § 763(a). In addition to distinguishing between Security-Based Swaps and
other Swaps, the Dodd-Frank Act likewise distinguishes between types of dealers and major participants by
providing separate definitions for "Swap Dealer" and "Security-Based Swap Dealer" and "Major Swap Par-
ticipant" and "Major Security-Based Swap Participant." See Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(16), (19), (21) (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a). For simplicity, this section will concentrate on the provisions applicable to Swaps
with the tacit understanding that the clearing requirements also apply to Security-Based Swaps.
213. Id. § 721(a)(21).
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party's own account are Swap Dealers.214 Further, any party that makes a market in
swaps, holds itself out as a swap dealer, or otherwise becomes commonly known as a
dealer or market maker, is also included within the definition of a Swap Dealer. 215 The
Dodd-Frank Act, however, provides that the CFTC can exempt a party that engages in
only a "de minimis quantity of swap dealing in connection with transactions with or on the
behalf of its customers." 216
Even if a party is not a Swap Dealer, the Dodd-Frank Act's provisions for mandatory
central clearing may still apply if the party fits within the definition of a Major Swap
Participant.217 A party is a Major Swap Participant if it is not a Swap Dealer and either (1)
"maintains a substantial position in swaps for any of the major swap categories ... exclud-
ing positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk" or (2) is an entity "whose
outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious ad-
verse effects on ... financial stability."218 Importantly, Congress declined to specify what
constitutes a "substantial position" in swaps; instead, it assigned the task to the CFTC and
directed it to establish the threshold at a level that is "prudent for the effective monitor-
ing, management, and oversight of the entities that are systemically important or can sig-
nificantly impact the financial stability of the United States."219
With respect to when central clearing requirements would actually apply to market
participants, the House and Senate adopted significantly different approaches in their ini-
tial versions of financial reform legislation. The Senate's bill-which demonstrated a
stronger preference in favor of clearing than the House's bill-mandated that all parties
must clear all Swaps unless an exception to the clearing requirement applied.220 In con-
trast, under the House bill clearing was mandatory only "if a clearing organization . . . will
accept the swap for clearing, and the [CFTC] has determined . . . that the swap is required
to be cleared." 221 Rather than presuming that clearing should always apply, the House's
bill directed the CFTC first to evaluate the various types of swaps in order to determine if
mandatory clearing is appropriate. 222
In the final Dodd-Frank Act, Congress elected to enact clearing requirements more
closely aligned with the initial House proposal. 223 Under the enacted legislation, central
clearing will be mandatory for all swaps that the CFTC determines are required to be
cleared. 224 In support of this system, Congress instructed the CFTC to review swaps "on
an ongoing basis" in order to determine if the "swap or group, category, type, or class of
214. Id. The term specifically excludes a party that enters into swaps for its own account "but not as a part of
a regular business." Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. § 721(a)(16) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § la).
218. Id. Significantly, the "substantial counterparty exposure" prong does not exclude swaps used for risk
management purposes. This suggests that it is possible for an entity to be a Major Swap Participant even
though it never trades derivatives for speculative purposes. See id.
219. Id.
220. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong., § 713(a)(3) (as introduced by
Sen. Dodd, Mar. 15, 2010) (adding 7 U.S.C. § 2(j)(1)(A)).
221. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., § 3103(a)(3) (ad-
ding 7 U.S.C. § 2(j)(1)(A)) (as passed by House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 2009).
222. Id.
223. Compare id., with Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)).
224. Dodd-Frank Act § 7 2 3(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)).
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swaps should be required to be cleared." 225 When assessing whether mandatory central
clearing is appropriate, Congress directed that the CFTC consider a variety of factors
including: notional exposures, liquidity, pricing data, clearing infrastructure, and effect on
systemic risk.226 Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act provides for a thirty-day public com-
ment period to aid the CFTC in its determination. 227 Finally, for those swaps that be-
come subject to mandatory central clearing, the Dodd-Frank Act provides for a
mechanism by which the CFTC can (1) stay the clearing requirement and (2) conduct an
additional review in order to determine if clearing is truly appropriate for the Swap in
question.228
Because Congress cast the general central clearing requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act
in terms that are both broad and mandatory, the available exceptions to the requirements
are very important. Most importantly, for swaps that are subject to mandatory clearing,
the Dodd-Frank Act bases the applicability of an end-user exception on the status of the
counterparties to the transaction.229 Specifically, the exemption applies only if one of the
counterparties is (1) not a "financial entity," (2) "is using the swaps to hedge or mitigate
commercial risk," and (3) informs the CFTC regarding how it satisfies its financial obliga-
tions for non-cleared swaps. 230 The conjunctive nature of the exemption suggests that for
swaps subject to mandatory central clearing, central clearing is always required for (1)
Swap Dealers or Major Swap Participants, both of which are considered a "financial en-
t ity" for purposes of the exemption; or (2) parties that use the swap for purposes other
than hedging or mitigating commercial risk.231
Ultimately, assuming that the exception applies in a given situation, the decision re-
garding whether to clear the swap otherwise subject to mandatory clearing rests with the
end-user. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the end-user counterparty eligible to take advan-
tage of the exemption is granted sole discretion regarding whether to clear the swap and, if
so, which CCP to clear through. 232 For any swap that remains bilaterally cleared how-
ever, Congress gave the CFTC the ability to set capital and initial and variation margin
requirements applicable to the counterparties to the swap.233 While it is apparent that the
authority of the CFTC with respect to capital and margin requirements extends to
counterparties that are Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, it is unclear how the
CFTC's newly granted authority might impact the end-user counterparties of Swap Deal-
ers or Major Swap Participants. 234 Furthermore, by allowing an entity to be a Swap
225. Id.
226. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)).
227. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(B)(iii)).
228. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(3)).
229. See id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)).
230. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)).
231. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)). The term "Financial Entity" includes swap dealers and major
swap participants, in addition to entities such as private funds and banking institutions. Id.
232. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(B), (E)).
233. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4s(e)).
234. Sen. Chambliss, Dodd-Frank Act Conference Committee Hearing, (une 29, 2010), http-//financial-
serv.edgeboss.net/wmedia/financialserv/conference062910.wvx; Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives
Ass'n, US Companies May Face US $1 Trillion in Additional Capital and Liquidity Requirements As a Result
of Financial Regulatory Reform According to ISDA Research Oune 29, 2010), available at http://
www.isda.org/media/press/2010/pressO62910.html. The initial version of the Dodd-Frank Act submitted to
the conference committee included an explicit end-user exemption from capital and margin requirements;
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Dealer or Major Swap Participant with respect to some types of Swaps but not others,
Congress created a situation where entities may be subject to substantially different regu-
latory requirements depending on the transaction at issue.235
Although the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the basic framework for mandatory central
clearing, the precise contours of the regulations necessary for the full implementation of
the framework are still unknown. In particular, the legislation specifically directs the
CFTC and the SEC, along with other federal agencies, to engage in a myriad of rulemak-
ing activities and studies. 236 According to the CFTC, there are thirty areas related to
swaps where the CFTC is required to promulgate rules. 237 Undoubtedly, the exact scope
of the requirements will turn on how the various regulatory agencies define vague phrases
such as "substantial position," what entities they include within the "de minimis" excep-
tion for Swap Dealers, and which swaps the CFTC determines are subject to mandatory
central clearing.238 As explained by Senators Dodd and Lincoln however, "clearing is at
the heart of reform." 239 Congress expects that "[i]ncreasing the use of central clearing-
houses, exchanges, appropriate margining, capital requirements, and reporting will pro-
vide safeguards for American taxpayers and the financial system as a whole."240 But, as the
next two sections will explain, despite the opinions of Congress and central clearing sup-
porters, central clearing is not necessarily a panacea for the challenges in the OTC deriva-
tives market. Instead, mandatory central clearing for OTC derivatives and the rules
promulgated to impose such requirements may increase systemic risk while reducing op-
portunities for prudent risk management by end-users.
B. INCREASED SYSTEMIC RISK THROUCH MANDATORY CENTRAL CLEARING
As previously discussed in Part II, by substituting a hub-and-spoke system in place of
the existing web of bilateral transactions, central clearing through a CCP may reduce the
risk associated with the interconnectedness of the OTC derivatives market.241 The con-
centration of counterparty risk in the CCP-if coupled with effective risk management
practices-can promote the stability of the financial system by reducing the probability
however, the conference committee removed the exemption. Despite efforts by Sen. Chambliss, the commit-
tee declined to reinsert the provision before the passage of the Act. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., § 731 (adding 7 U.S.C. § 4s(e)(8)) (conference base text).
235. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(16) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § la).
236. DAVIS POLK, SUMMARY OF TIlE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION AcT, ENAcTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010 i (2010), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/70
84f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7cO25ed2ecffPresentation/PublicationAttachment/d4495c7-be-4e9-ba77-f786
fb90464a/070910_FinancialReform-Summary.pdf. Davis Polk estimated that the full implementation of the
Dodd-Frank Act would require a total of 243 rulemakings, 67 one-time studies or reports, and 22 new peri-
odic reports. Id.
237. Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. COMMODITY FUTUREs TRADING COMM'N [CFTC], httpI//www.cftc.gov/
LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/index.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2011).
238. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(16) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a); Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(A); see Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 51429 (advance notice of proposed rulemaking Aug. 20, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. I and pt. 240).
239. 156 CONG. REC. H5248 (une 30, 2010) (letter from Sen. Dodd and Sen. Lincoln to Rep. Frank and
Rep. Peterson).
240. See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 136 (2010).
241. See generally supra Section H.
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that, like dominos, the failure of one major market participant will bring about the failure
of other major market participants and end-user counterparties. 242 Through legislation
mandating the use of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market, Congress seeks to take advan-
tage of central clearing as a method of reducing systemic risk. But, because central clear-
ing promotes the creation of new systemically important institutions and eliminates some
opportunities for cross-product bilateral netting while only partially reducing the inter-
connectedness of the market, systemic risk may actually increase, rather than decrease,
under mandatory central clearing.
To effectively implement central clearing for any given derivative type, two conditions
must be present: standard terms and high trading volume.243 These attributes are essen-
tial because each is necessary for the success of the CCP's risk management policies. 244
First, the derivative contracts cleared must have standard terms in order for the CCP to
develop a valuation model for the derivative product. 245 As standardization decreases and
complexity increases, the derivative becomes more difficult and expensive for the CCP to
model.246 Unless the CCP can develop an acceptable model for valuation, it will be una-
ble to accurately manage its risk through margining requirements imposed on CMs.247 In
addition to standardization, the derivative must have a sufficient volume of trading activity
in order to support central clearing. 248 Without a large trading volume, accepting the
derivative for central clearing is unlikely to be cost effective for the CCP or the CM.249
Furthermore, without significant volume, the CCP cannot accurately plan for the liquida-
tion of a defaulting CM's position in the derivative. 250 Because the CCP may only be able
to liquidate a position in a lightly traded derivative at a significant discount, agreeing to
clear the derivative may cause the CCP to suffer major losses if a CM defaults. 25 1
Because central clearing is not a reasonable option for all derivatives, the requirements
of the Dodd-Frank Act will force market participants to divide their OTC derivatives
portfolios into bilateral and centrally cleared components. 252 Central clearing can only
eliminate the web of bilateral transactions for those derivatives amenable to central clear-
ing. For any derivatives that continue to be bilaterally cleared by the counterparties rather
than submitted to a CCP, potentially because of a lack of standard terms or insufficient
volume, the interconnectivity of the market participants will remain. In other words, a
242. See generally supra Section II(B).
243. Heffner, supra note 153, at 99.
244. Comm. on Payments and Settlement Sys., New Developments in Settlement and Clearing Arrangements for
OTC Derivatives, BIS, Mar. 2007, at 27, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss77.pdf [hereinafter New
Developments].
245. Id.
246. Id.; see Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 8.
247. New Developments, supra note 244.
248. Heffner, supra note 153, at 99; Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By The U.S. Department Of The
Treasury Regarding The Regulation Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture,
11Ith Cong. 75 (2009) (written testimony of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and
Derivatives Association).
249. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 8.
250. Id.; New Developments, supra note 244.
251. Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regulation
OfOver-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 11Ith Cong. 74 (2009) (written
testimony of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives Association).
252. New Developments, supra note 244; supra Section m(A).
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properly implemented central clearing regime cannot itself eliminate the counterparty risk
between trading partners. Furthermore, any counterparty risk that remains after market
participants submit their eligible OTC derivatives to the CCP may still be systemically
significant. According to one commentator, because the credit derivatives issued by AIG
"would not have met any reasonable test of standardization," central clearing "would not
have prevented the AIG fiasco." 253
Depending on the circumstances, dividing derivatives portfolios into centrally cleared
and bilaterally cleared components can have either positive or negative consequences. On
the one hand, central clearing provides additional opportunities for multilateral netting
between market participants. 254 On the other hand, central clearing may reduce the op-
portunities for cross-product bilateral netting that exist between the parties to OTC de-
rivatives transactions. For example, suppose that Dealer A and Dealer B are
counterparties in two different types of derivative transactions. If Dealer A's exposure to
Dealer B under the first OTC derivative transaction is $10 million and Dealer B's expo-
sure to Dealer A under the second OTC derivative transaction is $20 million, the mutual
obligations result in a net counterparty exposure of only $10 million. If the first OTC
derivative is of a type subject to mandatory central clearing requirements though, the
exposure between the counterparties doubles to $20 million.255 In other words, if central
clearing is mandatory for some types of derivatives but not others, counterparties will lose
opportunities to conduct bilateral netting across the different products.
The repercussions from lost opportunities for bilateral netting, however, ultimately de-
pend on the role that central clearing assumes in the OTC derivatives market. 256 As ex-
plained in a report from the Financial Stability Board, "[t]o fully achieve the benefits of
central clearing, a critical mass of OTC derivatives products must move to [the] CCPs."257
Employing a CCP to clear a category of derivative is only effective if the gained opportu-
nities for multilateral netting are substantially greater than the lost opportunities for bilat-
eral netting across other categories of derivatives.2ss If this condition is not satisfied, then
clearing through the CCP may actually increase net counterparty exposure and thereby
promote financial instability. 259 Although the Dodd-Frank Act directs the CFTC and
SEC to consider the impact on systemic risk in its determination of whether to require
central clearing for a particular type of swap, it is uncertain whether the rules promulgated
by the agencies will adequately address the relationship between multilateral and bilateral
netting opportunities and its possible impact on net counterparty exposures. 260
Furthermore, the actual impact of mandating central clearing on counterparty expo-
sures will likely vary from market participant to market participant depending on the na-
253. Duffie, supra note 14, at 132.
254. See supra notes 196 through 203 and accompanying text.
255. For a similar illustration of bilateral netting opportunities lost through central clearing, see Darrell
Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterpany Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 3-4 (Rock Ctr. for
Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 46, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1348343.
256. See Duffie, supra note 14, at 131.
257. Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Refonr, supra note 147, at 10.
258. Duffie & Zhu, supra note 255, at 3.
259. Id. at 4; see Duffie, supra note 14, at 131.
260. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1677 (2010) (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)); Dodd-Frank Act, § 763(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(4)).
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ture of the entity in question and the structure of the CCP market as a whole. As the
Bank for International Settlements explained in a 2007 report,
the effect that splitting portfolios into centrally cleared and bilateral portions will
have on the measurement of the credit exposure of the bilaterally cleared deals is
unpredictable and will vary from dealer to dealer depending upon its type of business,
the type of contracts cleared and the participants in the clearing house.261
If the CCPs that emerge in response to mandatory central clearing elect to clear only a
few classes of derivatives or offer to clear the same classes of derivatives as other CCPs,
potential opportunities for multilateral netting will decrease. 262 By failing to operate in
ways that maximize the availability of multilateral netting, CCPs in the post Dodd-Frank
Act OTC derivatives market may inadvertently generate greater financial instability than
would exist under a system of only bilaterally cleared transactions. 263
Maximizing opportunities for multilateral netting, however, requires mandating wide-
spread participation in the CCPs by the entities in the OTC derivatives market and the
central clearing of multiple types of OTC derivatives through a limited number of
CCPs.264 Merging central clearing activities into a single CCP, however, presents regula-
tors with an interesting Catch-22 situation. According to a study conducted in 2009,
"[cilearing a moderately large fraction of all classes of derivatives in the same CCP reduces
average estimated exposures by 37%."265 The reduction of systemic risk possible through
the consolidation of central clearing activities into relatively few CCPs inevitably increases
the systemic importance of the CCPs that remain.266 Tempering the systemic importance
of large CCPs by distributing central clearing functions across a greater number of smaller
CCPs though, eliminates the reduction in systemic risk that flows from additional multi-
lateral netting.267
261. New Developments, supra note 244.
262. See Duffie & Zhu, supra note 255, at 22. For example, both the ICE Trust and the CME Group
currently clear CDS contracts in the United States. Cleared OTC Credit Default Swaps, CME GROUP, http://
www.cmegroup.com/trading/cds/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2011). Because each of these CCPs clear
only the single class of derivative and split the class between the two, there are lost opportunities for multilat-
eral netting within the CDS market. Clearing: ICE Trust-Credit Default Swap Clearing, INTERCONTINEN-
TAL ExCHANGE, 1ttps://www.theice.com/ice-trust.jhtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2011).
263. See Duffle & Zhu, supra note 255, at 18-19. Duffie and Zhu assert that relative to a market without
central clearing, "the introduction of a CCP that clears 100% of credit derivatives actually increases market-
wide expected exposures by about 5%." Id. If the same CCP cleared only seventy-five percent of CDS con-
tracts, expected exposures would increase by only three percent. Id. However, clearing seventy-five percent
of CDS contracts and interest rate swaps together through a single CCP could reduce expected exposures by
seventeen percent. Id.
264. Id. at 19-20.
265. Id. at 19.
266. HASENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.2.2.1.
267. Cf id.; Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 9, 14-15. CCP interoperability may eventually mitigate the
challenges associated with central clearing through multiple CCPs. However, as the Executive Chairman of
the CME Group explained to the House Agricultural Committee, "interoperability among futures clearing
houses was rejected by the industry, the CFTC and Congress because a fair examination of the proposal
revealed that forced interoperability was complex, risky and not cost effective." Hearing To Review Proposed
Legislation By The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regulation Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives
Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 11Ith Cong. 68 (2009) (prepared statement of Terrence Duffy,
Executive Chairman, CME Group Inc.).
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Undoubtedly, any CCPs established in response to the mandatory central clearing re-
quirements of the Dodd-Frank Act will employ rigorous risk management policies. In
fact, the Act directs that every CCP shall ensure that it "possesses the ability to manage
the risks associated with discharging the responsibilities of the derivatives clearing organi-
zation through the use of appropriate tools and procedures."268 The risk management
policies implemented will inevitably include membership criteria for CMs, initial and vari-
ation margin requirements, and guarantee fund contributions.269 Concentrating
counterparty risk in CCPs through mandatory central clearing however, makes it "all the
more important that CCPs function flawlessly."270 In fact, "the centrality of a CCP im-
plies that its failure risk could be more toxic than that of other market participants." 271
Should a large CCP in the OTC derivatives market default on its obligations as a buyer to
every seller and a seller to every buyer, the effect on the financial system could be
catastrophic. 272
By requiring central clearing for OTC derivatives, the government is in effect directing
the creation of new systemically important institutions. 273 While robust risk management
policies and capitalization requirements are likely to reduce the risk that CCPs will fail,
they cannot guarantee their stability. 274 Yet, in some situations there is a lack of consensus
268. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1687-92 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 7a-l(c)(2)). Whether direct government supervision over CCP risk management policies is appropriate is
subject to debate. Arguably, the self-interest of the CCP will provide sufficient incentive for it to respond
adequately to the risks associated with central clearing. See The Role of Central Counterparties, EUROPEAN
CTR. BANK & FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, 16 (2007), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
other/rolecentralcounterparties200707en.pdf (noting that markets respond quickly to mitigate risk not be-
cause they are risk averse, "but rather because the inclination to manage risk results from an interest in
increasing trading volumes.").
269. See supra text accompanying notes 156 to 172. The Dodd-Frank Act specifically states that CCPs,
"through margin requirements and other risk control mechanisms, shall limit the exposure of the [CCP] to
potential losses from defaults by its members and participants ... to ensure that-(I) the operations of the
[CCP] would not be disrupted; and (Il) nondefaulting members or participants would not be exposed to losses
that nondefaulting members or participants cannot anticipate or control." Dodd-Frank Act, § 725(c) (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-l(c)(2)).
270. JOHN W. MCPARTLAND, CHI. FED. RESERVE, Clearing and Settlement ofExchange Traded Derivatives, 1,
3 (2009), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/chicago-fed_1etter/2009/
cfloctober2009_267.pdf.
271. Duffie & Zhu, supra note 255, at 9.
272. See Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 5, 9 ("The failure of a CCP could suddenly expose many major
market participants to losses."); The Role of Central Counterparties, supra note 268, at 26 ("[The effectiveness
of a CCP's risk controls and the adequacy of its financial resources are critical aspects of the infrastructure of
the market it serves."); HASENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.2.2.1 (explaining "One potential threat associated
with high risk concentration in markets is that an unsuitable system configuration or weak supervision will
have a higher impact on the market than the deficiencies of any one participant. Faulty CCP risk manage-
ment has the potential to severely disrupt the markets ... . Consequently, a CCP's ability to monitor and
control the credit, liquidity, legal and operational risks it incurs as well as to absorb losses is essential for the
sound functioning of the markets it serves.").
273. See 155 CONG. REc. H14712 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2009) (statement of Rep. Garrett) ("The amendment
[concerning regulation of OTC derivatives] could very well exacerbate risk by forcing more derivative trans-
actions . . . to fewer and to fewer and to fewer clearinghouses, basically concentrating risk and doing the
opposite of what the American public wants, to avoid risk burdens and additional bailouts.").
274. New Developments, supra note 244, at 3 ("The key question is whether the risk controls employed by
CCPs for exchange traded derivatives would be equally effective when applied to OTC derivatives, which
generally are less liquid and more difficult to value accurately than exchange-traded derivatives."). Although
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concerning how regulations related to fundamental risk management practices should be
implemented. 275 For example, given the significant role that CMs will inevitably play in
determining which derivatives a CCP clears, commentators have adopted opposing views
on the extent to which CCPs should be permitted to limit membership.276 Furthermore,
considering that the failure of a CCP will likely stem from the default of one or more
major CMs, it is probable that any such failure will occur at a time when the markets are
already under a significant degree of stress. 277 Undoubtedly, if mandatory central clearing
in the OTC derivatives market results in a significant reduction in net counterparty expo-
sure, the probability of such CCP failure will decrease. 278 However, if the reduction in
net counterparty exposure is negligible (or increases) and existing systemically important
participants in the OTC derivatives market remain systemically important, the contagion
that could result from the failure of one CM may facilitate the collapse of the CCPs. 279
As the forgoing section suggests, the imposition of mandatory central clearing require-
ments for dealers and other significant participants in the OTC derivatives markets
presents two related challenges to financial stability. First, mandatory central clearing
itself does not eliminate the interconnectedness of market participants and may actually
increase net counterparty risk by reducing opportunities for bilateral netting.280 Second,
because the CCPs that emerge to provide central clearing services will themselves be sys-
temically important institutions, their failure may have a greater destabilizing effect on the
financial markets than would occur in an OTC derivatives market without central clear-
ing.281 The resulting threat to financial stability, however, is only one of the concerns
associated with the Dodd-Frank Act's mandatory central clearing provisions. As the next
section explains, requiring market participants to clear certain OTC derivative transac-
tions is likely to damage the ability of end-users to employ OTC derivatives products in
their risk management programs.
C. REDUCED OPTIONS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT THROUGH CENTRAL CLEARING
From the perspective of an end-user, OTC derivatives provide an invaluable tool with
which to manage risk. As discussed above, end-users can employ OTC derivatives to
mitigate risks ranging from changes in interest rates and probability of default on an obli-
CCP defaults are unusual, they are not unheard of. Examples of clearing house failures include those of
Caisse de Liquidation, Paris (1974), the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House (1983), and the Hong
Kong Futures Guarantee Corporation (1987). Duffie & Zhu, supra note 255, at 10, n.6.
275. Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Inter-
est, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732 (Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 37, 38, 39, & 40).
276. Id. The fact that the CMs, through margin and guarantee fund obligations, are ultimately responsible
for the financial stability of the CCP suggests that limiting membership is appropriate from a risk manage-
ment perspective. Some commentators are concerned, however, that unless CCPs have relaxed membership
criteria, the CMs, which are likely to be major participants in the OTC derivatives market, will have both the
ability and the incentive to prevent central clearing for derivatives that should otherwise be centrally cleared.
Id.
277. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 9.
278. See HASENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.2.2.1.
279. Cf Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 9; HAsENPuscH, supra note 150, § 2.2.2.1; Duffie & Zhu, supra
note 255, at 9.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 252 through 263.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 264 through 279.
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gation to the price of product inputs such as flour and chicken. 282 These derivative trans-
actions, which may include any combination of the four basic derivative types, enable
companies to avoid unexpected losses and reduce the volatility of the prices they charge
for their products and services. 283 At least one court has even gone so far as to hold
corporate directors liable for losses incurred as a result of their failure to implement and
supervise an adequate hedging program. 284
As the market for OTC derivatives grows, their role in risk management and impor-
tance to end-users increases in significance. Shortly after the Indiana Court of Appeals
released its opinion in Brane v. Roth, former CFTC Chairman Philip McBride Johnson
questioned whether "there might evolve a concept of per se, or automatic, liability when-
ever unwanted risks that can be avoided are not properly hedged." 285 Considering that
nearly all of the Fortune 500 companies based in the United States and roughly sixty-five
percent of all non-financial firms employ OTC derivatives in their risk management pro-
grams, it is not unreasonable to believe that Mr. Johnson's assessment may eventually
prove true.286 Nevertheless, the Dodd-Frank Act's mandatory central clearing provisions
may restrict the utility and availability of OTC derivatives by increasing the regulatory
uncertainty and cost associated with their use, and thereby make it more difficult for cor-
porate end-users to satisfy their hedging responsibilities.
Just as the growth of a robust market for OTC derivatives was a byproduct of the in-
creased regulatory certainty that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, the imposition of
new sources of legal uncertainty though the Dodd-Frank Act's central clearing require-
ments may constrict the market's future development. 287 In particular, questions will un-
doubtedly arise concerning which counterparties and derivatives will be subject to
mandatory central clearing and how capital and margin requirements will apply to un-
cleared transactions. 288 If in addressing these questions, the CFTC and SEC produce
282. See supra Section I(C).
283. See Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regula-
tion Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 11Ith Cong. 5 (2009) (testi-
mony of Jon Hixson, Director of Federal Government Relations, Cargill, Inc.).
284. Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 591-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). Upon the advice of the rural grain
cooperative's accountant, its directors authorized the manager to engage in hedging transactions in order to
mitigate the risk of future losses. Although grain sales comprised ninety percent of the cooperative's business
and totaled $7,300,000 for the year, the manager only entered into $20,050 worth of hedging contracts. The
Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that "the directors breached their duties by
retaining a manager inexperienced in hedging; failing to maintain reasonable supervision over him; and fail-
ing to attain knowledge of the basic fundamentals of hedging to be able to direct the hedging activities and
supervise the manager properly. . . ." Id. at 589-90. Whether the holding of Brane v. Roth stands for the
proposition that failing to hedge is a breach of the duty of care is subject to some debate. See Carolyn H.
Jackson, Note, Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM L. REv.
3205, 3258-59 (1999).
285. Philip McBride Johnson, Is Failing to Hedge a Legal Virus?, FuruREs, Nov. 1, 1993, at 18.
286. See Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regula-
tion Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 11Ith Cong. 73 (2009) (state-
ment of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives Association); Johnson,
supra note 285.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 90 through 103.
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rules that are overly broad or fail to adequately consider the potential for negative unin-
tended consequences, their effect may be to limit the availability of existing OTC deriva-
tives, discourage their use by end-users, and hinder the development of new derivatives
products.289
The potential for increased legal uncertainty is evident in comments submitted in re-
sponse to the CFTC and SEC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking related to the
definitions included in Tide VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.290 For example, the Working
Group of Commercial Energy Firms (the "Working Group") suggested that CFTC and
SEC rules should place the burden of identifying Major Swap Participants on the regula-
tory agencies rather than on the entities in the marketplace. 291 As the comment explains,
"in the absence of notification [by the SEC or CFTC], market participants will have the
certainty necessary to operate with confidence that they are not .. . Major Swap Partici-
pants." 292 By suggesting such a rule, the Working Group is attempting to avoid the situa-
tion in which end-users, such as large energy companies or agricultural co-ops, are forced
to either operate in the OTC derivatives market without knowing their classification or
else "seek legal certainty that they are not a Major Swap Participant" through no-action
requests. 293 Submissions from other entities and associations suggest that there is support
for the Working Group's approach. A comment submitted by the Coalition for Deriva-
tives End-Users stated that "there should not be a quota for end-users, nor a numerical
threshold based on size or notional value alone over which end-users mechanically fall
into the [Major Swap Participant] definition. .. . Moreover, there should be a presump-
tion against imposing the panoply of bank-like regulations on end-users."294
Considering that a party's ability to rely on the end-user exception from central clearing
first depends on it not being a Swap Dealer or Major Swap Participant, it is understanda-
ble that companies are focused on how the CFTC and SEC will structure rules related to
289. See Phillips, supra note 18.
290. See Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,429 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. I and pt. 240) (advance notice of proposed rulemak-
ing Aug. 20, 2010).
291. Letter from the Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, U.S. CFTC
3 (Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucn/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/df-
submissionl_-102210-emaill.pdf. The Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms "is a diverse group of
commercial firms in the energy industry whose primary business activity is the physical delivery of one or
more energy commodities to others, including industrial, commercial and residential consumers. Members
of the working group are energy producers, marketers and utilities." Id. at 1.
292. Id. at 3.
293. Id. at 6.
294. Letter from the Coalition for Derivatives End-Users to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, U.S. CFTC, & Eliza-
beth Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 5 (Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nam.org/-/medial
378Bl2D365024F60BFBD6BDC07284251/Coalition-forDerivativesEnd-UsersComments-toCFTC
andSEC.pdf. An alternative approach would insulate end-users from Major Swap Participant status by de-
fining "substantial position" at a sufficiently high threshold. See Letter from Excelon to David A. Stanwick,
Sec'y, U.S. CFTC, and Elizabeth Murphy, U.S. Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 7 (Sept. 20, 2010) available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-10/s71610-41.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Excelon]. For example, Ex-
elon, one of the country's largest electric companies, suggested that the "substantial position" component of
the Major Swap Participant definition "should not be set such that the amount of [Exelon's] net uncleared
swaps would be at or above the level associated with prudent monitoring, as required by the statute to consti-
tute a 'substantial' position. Exelon suspects that the same is true of many similarly-situated entities in the
markets in which it participates." Id.
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the Dodd-Frank Act definitions. 295 It appears, however, that the CFTC and SEC are
poised to reject the flexible approaches suggested by the Coalition for Derivatives End-
Users and the Working Group.296 In their proposed rules governing the definitions for
Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participation, the agencies instead expressed a preference
for thresholds and other objective criteria. 297 For example, under the proposed rule, any
entity that entered into more than twenty swaps or swaps with an aggregate notional
amount in excess of $100 million as a dealer during the previous twelve months would
automatically be ineligible for the de minimis exception from the definition of Swap
Dealer.298 As explained by the CFTC and SEC, the $100 million threshold, which re-
flects the aggregate notional amount of twenty small swaps, represents a level of activity
that "would be sufficient to warrant dealer registration and bring about the benefits of
such registration." 299 The CFTC and SEC understand, however, that such thresholds for
Swap Dealers will inevitably capture certain end-users that rely on the OTC derivatives
market, and as such, the end-user would become subject to the Act's mandatory central
clearing requirements. 30
Along with the domestic implications of the regulations that they implement, the
CFTC and SEC must also evaluate the international ramifications of any new rules. Spe-
cifically, considering the international nature of the OTC derivatives market, situations
will inevitably arise in which non-U.S. entities engage in derivatives transactions with
domestic entities. At present, such foreign entities are faced with uncertainty concerning
when their derivatives activities with entities based in the United States will subject them
to regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act.30' Already, the CFTC and SEC are aware of
and are considering this issue. The CFTC's proposed rule concerning Swap Dealer and
Major Swap Participant registration indicate that a foreign swap dealer that "regularly
enters into swaps with U.S. persons would likely be required to register as a Swap
295. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1679-81 (2010) (to be codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)); Phillips, supra note 18 (noting that companies "aren't changing the way they use
derivatives, yet, hoping instead that exemptions for commercial users will insulate them.").
296. Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap Participant," "Ma-
jor Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. 80,174, 80,188 (Dec.
21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1 and 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
297. Id. ("Objective criteria should permit regulators, market participants and entities that may be subject to
the regulations to readily evaluate whether swap or security-based swap positions meet the thresholds, and
should promote the predictable application and enforcement of the requirements governing major
participants.").
298. Id. at 80,180.
299. Id. at 80,180 n.37. Significantly, an entity can exceed the de minimis amount under one test without
exceeding it for the other. In other words, a market participant would exceed the de minimis standard and
likely require registration as a Swap Dealer if it entered into twenty swaps with a notional amount of $1
million or entered into one swap with a notional amount over S100 million. Id. at 75 Fed. Reg. 80,180 n.42.
300. 75 Fed. Reg. 80,178. While recognizing the importance and complexity of swaps in electricity genera-
tion and transmission operations, the CFTC and SEC note that "[n]evertheless, some participants [in the
electricity market] engage in swap dealing activities ... that are above the de minimis threshold set forth in
the proposed rule." Id. at 80,183.
301. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 722(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1673 (2010) (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. § 2(i)). The Act directs that the regulations pertaining to OTC derivatives only apply to activities
outside the United States that "have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, com-
merce of the United States." Id.
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Dealer." 302 Likewise, whether the CFTC would require a foreign entity to register as a
Major Swap Participant would likely depend on its positions with U.S. counterparties, its
use of U.S.-based CCPs and swap execution facilities, and its use of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce. 303
In addition to the challenges regarding entity classification standards, the end-user ex-
emption from central clearing itself provides a potential source of uncertainty for end-
users. Specifically, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the end-user exemption is available only
when one of the participants is not a "financial entity" and is using the derivative "to
hedge or mitigate commercial risk."30 Unfortunately for end-users, "the line between
speculation, investing or trading, on the one hand, and hedging, on the other, can at times
be difficult to discern;" however, as the CFTC stated, "the statute nonetheless requires
such determinations."30s Considering that the determination with respect to which side of
the line a particular transaction falls on can fundamentally change the requirements asso-
ciated with OTC derivative at issue, any ambiguity associated with rules promulgated to
address this issue has the potential to significantly impact the hedging activities of com-
mercial end-users. 306 Likewise, without a clear understanding of what constitutes "com-
mercial risk," end-users otherwise eligible for the exception will potentially encounter
situations in which they are unable to determine whether the exception is available.307
In addition to the requirements related to the status of the entity and the purpose of the
swap, a market participant relying on the end-user exception must also notify the CFTC
of how it generally meets its financial obligations for non-centrally cleared transactions. 30 8
With respect to the notification requirement, the Dodd-Frank Act allows the CFTC to
302. Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,379 (Nov. 23, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 3, 23, 170).
303. Id. at 71,382.
304. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)).
305. 75 Fed. Reg. 80,174, 80,195. In the proposed rule, the CFTC and SEC indicate their intent to inter-
pret the requirements related to hedging or mitigating commercial risk found in the Major Swap Participant
definition and the end-user exception consistently. Id. at n.124. To help sharpen the line, the CFTC and SEC
specifically requested that commenters provide comments regarding whether rules addressing "hedging or
mitigating commercial risk" should include "swaps facilitating asset optimization" and "dynamic hedging." Id.
at 80,195.
306. See id. at 80,194. Rather than providing clarification, the proposed definition of"hedging or mitigating
commercial risk" offered in connection with the Major Swap Participant definition, simply changes the focus
of the inquiry in situations where the swap does not clearly fall on either side of the line between speculation
and hedging. See id. Under the proposed definition, instead of wondering when a swap hedges or mitigates
commercial risk, entities will wonder when the swap is "{n]ot held for a purpose that is in the nature of
speculation, investing or trading." Id. at 80,195.
307. See Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)). Many comments addressing the
Major Swap Participant definition have stressed the importance of establishing a broad definition of the term
"commercial risk" in order to ensure all of the risks for which the end-user may elect to employ derivatives
are included. A proposal offered by Excelon would define commercial risk to include: [Alny economic risk
arising from financial, physical or any other attribute of a commercial enterprise including, but not limited to,
commodity price volatility risk, commodity price basis risk, connodity supply volatility risk, commodity
demand volatility risk, risk of failure of production, risk of loss of markets, weather risk, balance sheet risk,
credit risk and currency exchange rate risk. Letter from Excelon, supra note 294. In the context of Major
Swap Participant, the CFTC and SEC declined to separately define "commercial risk" and instead incorpo-
rated many of the ideas included in the suggestion offered by Excelon directly into the definition of "hedging
or mitigating commercial risk." Compare id. with 75 Fed. Reg. 80,214-15.
308. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)).
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establish the manner of the submission, but does not address whether the CFTC can
evaluate the adequacy of the end-user's plan for meeting its financial obligations. 309 Fur-
thermore, entities have already expressed concern over the costs and benefits associated
with how the CFTC and SEC implement the notification requirement.310 According to
the Electric Power Supply Association, the "notification process could create an immense
administrative burden on both end users and the [CFTC] if not structured appropri-
ately."311 Undoubtedly, end-users will either pass the costs associated with notification
requirements on to consumers in the form of higher prices or, if the costs are substantial,
may elect to accept the risk and not hedge at all. 312
Ultimately, the impact of the uncertainty associated with the Dodd-Frank Act's defined
terms and end-user exception will depend on the rules implemented by the SEC and
CFTC. If the rules written by the agencies are overly broad in scope and application, then
many OTC derivatives transactions used for risk management purposes will become sub-
ject to mandatory central clearing requirements, either because the end-user is deemed a
Swap Dealer or Major Swap Participant or because the hedging transaction itself does not
clearly fit within the scope of the end-user exception. 31 3 Likewise, should the rules
promulgated fail to resolve the uncertainty present in the Act itself, some end-users may
elect to avoid such uncertainty by either submitting swaps for central clearing "volunta-
rily" or by declining to participate in the OTC market at all. 314
Regardless of whether the OTC derivatives employed by commercial end-users are
more frequently submitted for central clearing as a result of the mandatory application of
the Dodd-Frank Act requirements or voluntary submission in the face of uncertainty, the
end result will be an increase in the cost managing risk through OTC derivatives. In the
bilateral transactions that occur in the OTC derivatives market, counterparties must make
determinations regarding credit support on an individualized basis based on their percep-
tion of the counterparty risk presented by the other party.315 While there was a growing
trend towards the collateralization of these transactions even before the enactment of the
309. See id.
310. See Letter from Electric Power Supply Ass'n to David A. Stanwick, Sec'y, U.S. CFTC 2 (Aug. 23,
2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/derivativellsub082310-
espa.pdf.
311. Id. The Electric Power Supply Association ("EPSA") explained in its comment that "[i]t is both not
feasible and not beneficial for such a notification process to occur on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but
rather the Commission should take a holistic approach to the financial wherewithal of an end user." Id.
EPSA proposed that the CFTC should rely on an "annual self-certification process through which an end-
user's board or governing body certifies that the end-user has the resources to 'generally meet its financial
obligations.'" Id.
312. Sam Peterson, There's a Derivative in Your Cereal, ATLANTIc, July 29, 2010, http://www.theadantic.
com/business/archive/2010/07/theres-a-derivative-in-your-cereal/
605 8 2/.
313. See Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(16) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § l(a)(33)); § 721(a)(21) (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. § l(a)(49)); § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)).
314. Cf Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 3-4 (noting that pressure from regulators related to trade
confirmation backlogs and compression trades intended to reduce aggregate notional amounts outstanding
was sufficient to produce a response from participants in the OTC derivatives market).
315. 2 ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, DOCUMENTATION FOR DERIVATIVEs 1057-58 (2002).
ISDA identifies five methods counterparties can use to manage credit risk: (1) do not enter into the transac-
tion; (2) possess sufficient financial strength to accept the risk of non-payment; (3) minimize the size of the
risk through netting; (4) obtain protection against the risk from a third-party; and (5) collateralization. ISDA
COLLATERAL STEERING COMM., MARKET REVIEW OF OTC DERIVATIVE BILATERAL COLLATERALIZATION
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Dodd-Frank Act, requiring corporate end-users to post collateral was still a relatively un-
common practice. 316 Lending institutions, which typically function as dealers in the OTC
derivatives market, generally "view the extension of credit through OTC transactions
without collateral arrangements as another facet of their overall lending activities. .. ."317
Even in OTC derivatives transactions that are collateralized, counterparties often estab-
lish "Thresholds" that represent the amount of credit exposure one party is willing to
accept to the other on an uncollateralized basis. 318 As a result, many OTC derivatives
transactions involving end-users, at least at inception, do not require any transfer of collat-
eral between the parties.319
In contrast to the collateralization practices common in the bilateral market, CCPs rou-
tinely require counterparties to post initial and variation margin based on the size and
volatility of the transaction cleared. 320 For end-users subject to mandatory central clear-
ing under the Dodd-Frank Act, the obligation to post collateral in order to satisfy margin
requirements will represent a significant increase in the cost of using derivatives to man-
age risk.321 To illustrate the significance of the cost increase, an initial margin require-
ment equal to ten percent of the notional amount would force an entity to post $100,000
worth of collateral to cover a contract with a $1,000,000 notional amount.322 As Cargill
explained in its testimony before the House Committee on Agriculture, a $100,000 initial
PRAcTIcEs 5 (2010), available at http://www.isda.org/c and-a/pdflCollateral-Market-Review.pdf [hereinafter
Market Review].
316. ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2009 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.isda.org/c-and-a/pdflSDA-Margin-
Survey-2009.pdf; Market Review, supra note 315, at 33-34. ISDA's margin survey indicated that between 2003
and 2009, collateralization increased from thirty to sixty-five percent of all trades. ISDA MARGIN SURVEY
2009, supra at 7. Despite the increase in collateralization of OTC derivatives, however, the percentage of
transactions with corporate counterparties that include collateral agreements remains relatively small. Id. at
8, chart 4.2.
317. Market Review, supra note 315, at 33. Parties may also elect not to implement collateral agreements
because of (1) the "operational complexity associated with collateralization;" (2) the inability ofa counterparty
to post adequate forms of collateral due to liquidity constraints; (3) external constraints such as negative
pledge provisions in other credit agreements, and (4) cost. Id. at 33-34. As explained by the European Asso-
ciation of Corporate Treasurers, non-financial companies using derivatives to hedge business risks "account
for only a small portion of derivative[s] outstanding[ ]. Individually or collectively, they do not represent a
systemic risk. Taking corporate credit is usually part of a bank's business." Corporate Concerns About OTC
Derivative Regulation, EUR. Ass'N OF CORPORATE TREASURERS, Sept. 2009, at 3, http://www.treasurers.org/
system/files/otccorporateconcems0909.pdf.
318. 2 GOoCH & KLEIN, supra note 315, at 1069.
319. See Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By The U.S. Department Of The Treasury Regarding The Regula-
tion Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 27 (2009) (testi-
mony of Mr. Richard B. Hirst, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Delta Air Lines, on behalf of Air
Transport Association). Mr. Hirst noted that "most fuel hedging that airlines do is done on the swaps market
in nonstandardized ways under conditions in which it is not necessary to post initial margin." Id. ISDA
explains that a Threshold is "similar to the idea of extending a loan-both are forms of unsecured credit
exposure." Market Review, supra note 315, at 43.
320. See Market Review, supra note 315, at 43 (contrasting Threshold with Independent Amount); supra text
accompanying notes 162 through 166.
321. See HASENPUSCH, supra note 150, § 2.1.2.2.1.3, n.83 (noting that "the challenge faced by CCPs is to set
the initial margin at a level sufficient to provide protection against all but the most extreme and predictable
price moves, but not so high as to damage market liquidity or discourage the use of the CCP.").
322. Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By the U.S. Department of the Treasury Regarding the Regulation of
Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 11I th Cong. 30 (2009) (testimony of
Jon Hixson, Director of Federal Government Relations, Cargill, Inc.).
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margin requirement is "major change for a small player."323 In addition to initial margin,
commercial end-users subject to central clearing will also need to anticipate and be capa-
ble of satisfying any amount of variation margin that the CCP may demand. 324 To accom-
plish this, it will be necessary for the end-user to either maintain lines of credit or hold
large amounts of capital in reserve-both of which are costly propositions. 325
Further exacerbating the potential impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act's definitional provi-
sions and the uncertain application of the end-user exception on the OTC derivatives
market, are the costs associated with the Act's capital and margin requirements for un-
cleared swaps. 326 The possible negative consequences of the margin requirements on
OTC derivatives and risk management are two-fold. First, the provisions will impose
additional burdens on end-users captured by the Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant
definitions even when the derivative type is not subject to mandatory central clearing. 327
Second, because the margining requirements, as enacted, apply to all uncleared swaps,
end-users are likely to incur significant additional costs in all their OTC derivative trans-
actions even when the end-user exemption from mandatory central clearing applies.328
Concerns related to the application of the Dodd-Frank Act's margin provisions to end-
users stem from the Conference Committee's decision to eliminate the requirement's ex-
press end-user exception from the final act.329 Had the provision remained in the enacted
version of the legislation, initial and variation margin requirements established by the
CFTC and applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants would not have ap-
plied when one of the counterparties was not a Swap Dealer or Major Swap Participant. 330
The legislative history that accompanied the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act explains that
despite the absence of the exception, CFTC and SEC "rules may not be set in a way that
requires the imposition of margin requirements on the end user side of a lawful transac-
tion." 331 As enacted, however, the CFTC and SEC are free to impose initial and variation
323. Id.
324. Corporate Concerns About OTC Derivative Regulation, supra note 317, at 2; see A Trillion Unintended Conse-
quences, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010. ISDA notes that that an initial margin requirement equal to one percent
of the notional amount of the contract is "a typical level." Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n,
supra note 234. Although the percentage suggested by ISDA figure is substantially smaller than the initial
margin figure stated by Mr. Hixon, the aggregate effect is still dramatic. According to ISDA, if a one percent
initial margin requirement were applied to all derivatives contracts entered into by end-users, "US companies
would face a $213 billion collateral requirement." Id.
325. Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Regarding the Regulation of
Over-tbe-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 11Ith Cong. 34 (2009) (statement of
Rep. Randy Neugebauer, H. Agriculture Comm.); Corporate Concerns About OTC Derivative Regulation, supra
note 317.
326. See Peterson, supra note 312.
327. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731, 124 Stat. 1376, 1704-06 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 4s(e)(1)).
328. See id.; Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, supra note 234.
329. A Trillion Unintended Consequences, supra note 324.
330. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 11Ith Cong. (adding 7 U.S.C.
§ 4s(e)(8)) (conference base text).
331. 156 CONG. REc. H5248 (June 30, 2010) (letter from Sen. Dodd & Sen. Lincoln to Rep. Frank & Rep.
Peterson). Discussing the value of the legislative history, an article published in the Wall Street Journal
stated: "So various Democrats have offered to write letters explaining to regulators that they never intended
for these onerous rules to apply to commercial end users. As if a note on Congressional letterhead would
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margin requirements that apply to the Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants even
when their counterparty is an end-user.332
Effectively, the margin requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act may eliminate the ability
of market participants to make independent determinations. regarding when to require
collateral for a transaction. Instead, just as if the counterparties submitted the contract for
central clearing, each end-user may find itself subject to posting initial and variation mar-
gin to cover the OTC derivatives that it enters into.3 33 According to ISDA, these margin-
ing requirements could cost corporate end-users as much as $1 trillion.334 Even if the
margin requirements do not apply directly to the end-users, imposing the requirements
on Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants even when the counterparty is an end-user
will still increase the cost of the derivative for the end-user.335 As the Electric Power
Supply Association (EPSA) explained in a letter to the CFTC, "[i]f the [CFTC] imposes a
margin requirement on financial entities when they are counterparties to end user swap
transactions, it would simply be a back-door way of imposing this cost on the end user."336
Considering the importance of OTC derivatives in risk management programs, the in-
creased uncertainty and cost that will result from mandatory central clearing and margin-
ing requirements will have significant negative repercussions on end-users, their
customers, and the economy.. Specifically, as the cost and uncertainty associated with en-
tering into OTC derivatives transactions increases, it will become more expensive for end-
users to manage risk. The increase in expense may "lead to higher costs for consumers
and lead some end-users to question the value or benefit of these important risk manage-
ment tools going forward."337 If end-users elect not to hedge however, they will remain
subject to the risks that they would otherwise avoid through OTC derivatives.338 llti-
override a statute passed by Congress and signed by the President. Expect lawsuits galore." A Trillion Unin-
tended Consequences, supra note 324.
332. See Dodd-Frank Act § 73 1(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4s(e)(2)).
333. Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, supra note 234; see supra text accompanying notes 161
through 168.
334. Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, supra note 234. According to ISDA, domestic compa-
nies would be required to post approximately $266 billion in initial margin and $140 billion in variation
margin. The remainder of the $1 Trillion comes from the companies' need to maintain additional liquidity in
order to cover potential future exposure with their counterparties. Id. Addressing ISDA's findings, Rep.
Bachus argued that "[ilnstead of allocating precious resources to hire more people or increase wages, com-
mercial companies will have to post capital every time they enter into a derivatives contract to hedge against
legitimate business risk." 156 CONG. REc. H5253 Gune 30, 2010).
335. See 156 CONG. REc. H5248 june 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Peterson). Rep. Peterson noted that
"regulators [have] no authority to impose margin requirements on anyone who is not a swap dealer or a major
swap participants" and that while they "do have authority over the dealer or MSP side of a transaction, we
expect the level of margin required will be minimal." Id. Rep. Frank, agreeing with Rep. Peterson, stated
that the margining requirements "are going to be done, I think, with an appropriate touch." Id. (statement of
Rep. Frank).
336. Comment from EPSA to David A. Stanwick, Sec'y, U.S. CFTC 2 (Aug. 23, 2010), available at https//
docs.google.con/leafid=laDkt-IrPJaENefhDO-RYiDiFEGwFpI4czrAOu6kHyjFWIFPZsfh-mLG23ITH&
hl=en. The National Council of Farmer Cooperatives echoed the position of the EPSA- "If initial and varia-
ble margin requirements are imposed in addition to capital requirements on uncleared swaps with dealers and
[Major Swap Participants], higher transaction costs will be passed on to end-users." Over-the-Counter Deriva-
tives, Nat'l Council of Farmer Cooperatives to the U.S. CFTC 1, available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission_091410_8_0.pdf.
337. Comment from EPSA to David A. Stanwick, Sec'y, supra note 336.
338. Corporate Concerns About OTC Derivative Regulation, supra note 317; Peterson, supra note 312.
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mately, as the utility of OTC derivatives decline because of uncertainty and higher costs,
the parties likely to suffer the most are the customers. 339 Companies that absorb the
higher cost of risk management through OTC derivatives will pass at least part of the
expense to the customer through higher prices for goods and services while covering the
remainder by diverting resources away from other productive activities. 34 Alternatively,
end-users that decide to operate without hedging risk will subject their customers to
greater and more frequent pricing volatility while seeking out other ways of eliminating
risk.341
V. Conclusion
During the legislative process, stakeholders and legislators largely agreed that regula-
tory reform in the OTC derivatives market was appropriate, but differed on the manner in
which the reform should proceed. 342 Government agencies, such as the Department of
Treasury, the CFTC, and the SEC, generally favored proposals that gave government
officials significant authority to intervene in the operation of the OTC derivatives mar-
ket.343 In the legislation enacted, these administrative agencies largely prevailed-the fi-
nal Dodd-Frank Act grants the CFTC and the SEC considerable discretion and authority
to promulgate rules concerning the details of the mandatory central clearing and margin-
ing requirements. 344 Whether the OTC derivatives provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
will achieve the goals of ensuring greater transparency and financial stability, however, is
unclear. As Professor Hu explained to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs,
339. See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, supra note 336. ("Furthermore, if the costs are prohibitively high, the
ability of farmer cooperatives to provide their producers risk management tools, such as forward pricing, will
be diminished."); Phillips, supra note 18 (noting the Dodd-Frank Act may force agricultural cooperatives to
stop offering hedging opportunities to customers and that they may be forced to change their operations if
they are unable to hedge their own risks).
340. Peterson, supra note 312.
341. Id.; A Trillion Unintended Consequences, supra note 324. As an example, the Wall Street Journal suggests
that a company could eliminate the risk associated with foreign exchange rates by moving jobs to the country
where the purchases occur so that its revenues and expenses are in the same currency. Id.
342. See generally, e.g., Hearing To Review Proposed Legislation By The US. Department Of The Treasury Regard-
ing The Regulation Of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 11Ith Cong.
(2009) (providing differing views on regulatory reform from members of the House Committee on Agricul-
ture and a variety of market participants, including ISDA, the CME Group, Cargill Inc., the National Rural
Electric Cooperatives Association, the Air Transport Association, and the Working Group of Commercial
Energy Firms, among others).
343. See Hearing on OTC Derivatives Reform and Addressing Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 11lth Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Treasury
Secretary of the United States); See also Over-The-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Trans-
pareny and Reduce Risks, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Securities, Insurance & Investment of the Sen. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 11lth Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC);
Over-The-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce Risks, Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Securities, Insurance & Investment of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs,
11Ith Cong. (2009) (statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman, CFTC).
344. See Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. CFTC, Remarks Before ISDA Regional Conference (Sept. 16,
2010), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ChairmanGaryGensleropagensler-50.htnl.
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[I]n a financial crisis, especially one with deep derivatives roots, it is too easy to focus
solely on the dark side of OTC derivatives. Directly encouraging regulated financial
institutions to migrate to exchange-traded derivatives has benefits as well as costs.
Similarly, the differing regulatory regimes for "standardized" and "customized" OTC
derivatives will trigger differing burdens. As to these and other decisions, careful
consideration of the net impact of regulatory efforts will be necessary.345
Unfortunately, as this article explains, the inclusion of mandatory central clearing pro-
visions in the Dodd-Frank Act will not guarantee greater stability or transparency. On the
contrary, the evidence suggests that the imposition of requirements that force counterpar-
ties to clear OTC derivatives transactions through a CCP may actually increase systemic
risk and the cost of risk management opportunities for end-users. Arguably, the legislative
process focused too heavily on the "Jurassic Park gone awry" vision of the OTC deriva-
tives market without sufficiently considering the benefits that OTC derivatives provide. 346
In their letter to Representatives Frank and Peterson, however, Senators Dodd and Lin-
coln asserted that "a consistent Congressional directive . . . has been to protect end users
from burdensome costs associated with margin requirements and mandatory clearing." 347
As one analyst speculated though, "because lawmakers did not appreciate that the impact
would reach far beyond Wall Street," some parts of the law "afford[] regulators with no
choice but to take a heavy-handed approach wherein negative unintended consequences
are unavoidable."348 As such, the ability of the CFTC and SEC to avoid imposing legal
uncertainty and increased cost on end-users, and by extension harming the OTC deriva-
tives market, seems doubtful.
Furthermore, the vesting of authority under the Dodd-Frank Act with the CFTC and
the SEC creates concerns of international proportion that the regulatory entities may be
unable to adequately address. Clearly, as the G-20 nations indicated following the To-
ronto Summit, there is strong international support for mandatory central clearing of
OTC Derivatives. 349 In the G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, the G-20 nations reaf-
firmed their "commitment to trade all standardized OTC derivatives contracts on ex-
changes or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and clear through central
counterparties ... by end-2012 at the latest." 350 The implementation of the Dodd-Frank
345. Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce Risks, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Securities, Insurance & Investment of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, &, Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Henry Hu, Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance,
University of Texas School of Law).
346. See id. Professor Hu indicates that two contrasting visions influence the debate over the regulation of
derivatives. The first vision, "a financial Jurassic Park," consists of "financial scientists" developing new de-
rivatives products that "are invented, introduced, and then evolve and mutate." Id. Eventually, the products
"destroy their creators in the wholesale capital market" and then "escape and wreak havoc in the retail market
and in economies worldwide." Id. The second vision, which conjures images "of the soothing, perfect hedges
found in a formal English or Oriental garden," focuses on "order-the sanctuary from an otherwise chaotic
universe-made possible by financial science." Id.
347. 156 CONG. REC. H5248 (une 30, 2010) (letter from Sen. Dodd & Sen. Lincoln to Rep. Frank & Rep.
Peterson).
348. Peterson, supra note 312.
349. The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, G-20, 19 (June 2010), http://www.g20.org/Documents/
g20 _declarationen.pdf.
350. Id.
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Act as a component of international financial regulatory reform, however, will require
global coordination and consistency that may not be possible.3ss As inconsistencies in the
implementation of international regulation emerge, particularly with the scope of the enti-
ties and transactions subject to regulation, there exists the potential for regulatory arbi-
trage between the requirements imposed by different jurisdictions. 352
If a system of mandatory central clearing is not the solution to the problems that the
OTC derivatives market faces though, then what is? Even before the recent financial
crisis and the ensuing uptick in pressure for legislative reform, industry and regulatory
stakeholders were working to improve the stability of the OTC derivatives market. 35 3
The changes that regulators and market participants implemented, both before and after
the crisis, continue to foster greater stability within the financial system. For example, the
DTCC Trade Information Warehouse, a data repository for credit derivative transactions,
promotes transparency by permitting regulators, along with the public, to review the de-
tails of the CDS market.35 4 Likewise, the execution of portfolio compression trades dra-
matically reduces the total notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding and thereby
decreases counterparty risk.35 In fact, even in the absence of a legislative mandate, major
OTC derivatives dealers were committing to submit a greater portion of their eligible
OTC derivatives transactions to CCPs for clearing. 35 6 Through voluntary, rather than
351. SeeJill Sommers, Comm'r, U.S. CFTC, Address at Georgetown University: Financial Reform, What's
Next? A U.S. and Global Perspective Examining the Opportunities and Challenges Ahead (Oct. 26, 2010),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opasommers- 1 .html.
352. Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform, supra note 147, at 28.
353. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 2. Obviously, changes made before the financial crisis were insuffi-
cient to prevent the crisis. However, some changes were instrumental in mitigating the crisis' severity. For
example, because of pressure exerted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, dealers eliminated the back-
log in unconfirmed trades before the failure of Lehman Brothers occurred. As a result, "of the over 900,000
OTC derivative trades on Lehman's books, only one transaction has been challenged due to an open confir-
mation." Id.
354. Id. The DTCC Trade Information Warehouse is a step toward the "informational clearinghouse" sug-
gested by Professor Hu in a Yale Law Journal article published in 1993. See Over-The-Counter Derivatives:
Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce Risks, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Securties, Insur-
ance & Investment of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Henry Hu, Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance, University of Texas School of Law). In
his article, Professor Hu argued that the establishment of a central, comprehensive, and continuously updated
trade database of "OTC derivatives, broken down by genus, family, and species," would "contribute to solv-
ing both regulator and banker information failures." Hu, siupra note 72, at 1505-07. Ultimately, the trade
data repository concept was captured as a component of the Dodd-Frank Act: "Each swap (whether cleared
or uncleared) shall be reported to a registered swap data repository." Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 727, 124 Stat. 1376, 1697 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13(G)).
355. Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 5, at 2. In a compression trade, groups of counterparties identify and
cancel redundant positions, replacing them with individual trades that reflect the net economic result of the
original positions. See id. at 27. Between January 2008 and March 2010, compression trades reduced the
notional amount outstanding in CDS market from over $60 trillion to around $26 trillion. Id. at 4. By
shrinking the total notional amount outstanding, compression trades in the CDS market reduce the benefits
that the central clearing of CDS transactions can achieve. Duffie & Zhu, supra note 255, at 3.
356. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Market Participants Commit to Expand Central Clearing for
OTC Derivatives (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/
ma090908.html. In September 2009, the senior management of fifteen dealers committed to submit ninety
percent of new eligible interest rate derivative trades and ninety-five percent of new eligible CDS trades for
clearing by December of 2009. The commitment was made by Bank of America-Merrill Lynch; Barclays
Capital; BNP Paribas; Citigroup; Commerzbank AG; Deutsche Bank AG; Goldman, Sachs & Co.; HSBC
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compulsory, clearing, market participants maintain the ability to exercise discretion in
order to strike the optimal balance between the costs and benefits of clearing.357 While
none of these pre-Dodd-Frank Act changes alone was likely to guarantee stability within
the financial system, they do demonstrate the gains that regulators and key market partici-
pants could have achieved through collaboration. Perhaps through sustained coopera-
tion-and gentle regulatory pressure when necessary-stakeholders could have found the
right combination of tools that promoted financial stability, reduced systemic risk, and
ensured the continued development and availability of OTC derivatives. 358
Group; JP Morgan Chase; Morgan Stanley; The Royal Bank of Scotland Group; Socit6 G~nbrale; UBS AG;
and Wachovia Bank, NA Letter from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch et al., to Hon. William C. Dudley,
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/new-
sevents/news/markets/2009/ma090908c.pdf.
357. Cf Letter from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch et al., to Hon. William C. Dudley, President, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, supra note 356.
358. Sommers, supra note 351 (noting that one of the challenges associated with international regulatory
reform of the OTC market is that some "jurisdictions seem to feel that this type of market evolution is better
suited to incentives rather than prescriptive rules").
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